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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the intention and effectiveness of
the changes initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) with emphasis on
the United States Navy. This assessment considers the
implications for future national security of present trends
in the balance of power between joint and service
institutions within the Department of Defense (DOD).
Interviews conducted by the author with key individuals
involved in the writing and implementation of GNA
legislation, coupled with a review of the literature,
provide the basis for understanding the intent behind GNA
and its provisions. In assessing the effectiveness of GNA
this thesis focuses on three areas: operations, plans, and
people and how the key change mechanisms implemented by GNA
are impacting these areas. The author forwards policy
recommendations, for both DOD and the Navy aimed at making
"jointness" more relevant and meaningful.
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This thesis examines the intention and effectiveness of
the changes initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA) with emphasis on
the United States Navy. This assessment considers the
implications for future national security of present trends
in the balance of power between joint and service
institutions within the Department of Defense (DOD).
Officer promotions, assignments, and education are the
fundamental mechanisms driving DOD from a service-dominated,
towards a balanced service/joint organizational culture.
While these mechanisms have succeeded in shifting the
balance of power, the results have fallen short of both an
ideal balance and Congressional expectations. This study
attempts to explain the gap between actual results, the
ideal balance, and what was expected by Congress.
The methodology utilized in this thesis establishes a
baseline for comparing the cultural change mechanisms of GNA
by modelling United States Naval culture. An historical
review of United States defense reforms portrays the tension
between efforts aimed at creating an ideal joint/service
balanced culture and Naval culture. This background
provides the setting for an analysis of GNA. Interviews
conducted by the author with key individuals involved in the
writing and implementation of GNA legislation, coupled with
a review of the literature, provide the basis for
vii
understanding the intent behind GNA and its provisions. The
interviews conducted between May and November 1991 included:
- Rep. Ike Skelton (D-MO), chairman of the HPSC
subcommittee on military education;
- Rep. Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA), chairman of the HASC
investigative subcommittee;
- Rep. John Kasich (R-OH), member HASC;
- Dr. Archie Barrett, professional staff member HASC;
- James R. Locher, III, ASD SO/LIC and a former member
of the SASC professional staff;
- VADM M. Boorda, Chief of Naval Personnel;
- RADM James Cossey, Assistant Deputy CNO for
Operations, Plans, and Policy (OP-06B).
In assessing the effectiveness of GNA, this thesis
focuses on three areas: operations, plans, and people, and
how the key power mechanisms are impacting these areas.
This thesis concludes that:
- GNA has resulted i,; a stronger joint institution
within DOD. However, the results have fallen short of both
an ideal balance and Congressional expectations.
- The Navy has worked hard to accommodate the changes
mandated by GNA. But this has not translated into visceral
internalization of the concept of "jointness" by the Navy's
culture.
- The Navy's autonomous, operationally orientated
culture has put it at variance with the national trend
toward unification and jointness. Service-unique
incompatibilities still exist between the Navy's
professional military education system, staffing emphasis,
and promotion/assignment philosophy and the post-GNA
national emphasis on "jointness."
- During interviews the rejection of my proposition
"that balancing power between the service and joint
institutions must involve a cultural shift in the Navy" was
surprising. It may "not have been the intention to change
the Navy culture," as Rep. Ike Skelton contends, but can we
realistically have it both ways? This thesis argues that
you can't permanently change the balance of power between
service and joint institutions without altering service
culture.
viii
- The Title IV provisions covering the promotion,
assignment, and education of officers are the key reasons
why GNA is shifting the balance of power within DOD. GNA
coupled with the environmental changes (diminished Soviet
threat and reduced defense budgets) have made cultural
change inevitable. Service culture, particularly the Navy's
culture, is changing.
- Whether the Navy takes aggressive initiative to shape
tiese cultural changes or continues to tread a more cautious
middle ground of accommodation will determine how the
resulting balance of power within DOD is forged.
- Since 1947 the Navy has been on the "losing side" of
every contentious issue involving service unification.
While the Congress and the nation have moved in one
direction, the Navy has moved in another. Although intended
to preserve naval autonomy, this divergence has stimulated
more conflict and created unwarranted perceptual blocks to
legitimate naval viewpoints.
- The term "jointness" is ill-defined. Furthermore,
the translation of "joint matters" into joint assignments
via the joint duty assignment list (JDAL) reflects both this
inconsistency (fewer warfighters, more supporters) and thus
a divergence from the original Congressional intent.
- The detailed and numerically orientated focus of GNA
and its subsequent frequent revisions have unwittingly
skewed the emphasis from developing and assessing jointness
as a system aimed at improving national security to one
emphasizing bookkeeping and numbers. The burgeoning number
of wickets may preclude the Admiral Bull Halsey of tomorrow
from advancing under today's system.
- The Congressional focus on joint and service PME, by
eschewing other important areas encompassing readiness such
as training and exercises, has created an iibalance in the
factors necessary for developing healthy "joint
perspectives" in officers and ultimately improving national
security.
Finally, this study offers several policy
recommendations to facilitate a smoother implementation of
the GNA provisions and to improve the present system's




The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA)' legislated far-reaching
changes to the National Security 5ct of 1947 (NSA). This
thesis examines the intention and effectiveness of these
changes with emphasis on the United States Navy and
considers the implications for future national security of
present trends in the balance of pcer between joint and
service institutions within the Department of Defense
(DOD) .2
In enacting the joint officer personnel policies
contained in Title IV of GNA, Congress went beyond
structural reform of DOD organization by attempting to alter
organizational behavior through the modification of
attitudes and beliefs. Congress intended to shape the roots
of service organizational culture. As the House Panel on
Military Education Report states, "Congress' objective is
tIn this study references to GNA will refer to the original Act which was
passed in 1986 and subsequent amendments to the Act which have been nearly an
annual occurrence as part of Defense Authorization Acts. This study views
the GNA as a process of reforms which has continued until the present.
2Power in this thesis is considered to be the ability to implement and
carry out plans, conduct operations, and control personnel. This author
acknowledges that programming control is a majcr source of power within DOD.
This thesis does not directly assess the programming area. Joint
institutions are defined as the Joint Staff (JS) and unified command staffs.
Service institutions refer to the Navy and Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army.
While Congress views the Navy and Marine Corps as a team when considering
joint matters, this thesis primarily focuses on the Navy.
nothing short of a change in the culture of the officer
corps. "'
Officer promotions, assignmcnts, and education are the
fundamental mechanisms driving DOD from a service-dominated
culture, towards a balanced service/joint organizational
culture. While these mechanisms have succeeded in shifting
the balance of power, the results have fallen short of both
an ideal balance and Congressional expectations. This study
attempts to explain the gap between actual results, the
ideal balance, and what was expected by Congress.
The methodology utilized in this thesis establishes a
baseline for comparing the cultural change mechanisms of GNA
by modelling United States Naval culture. An historical
review of United States' defense reforms portrays the
tension between efforts aimed at creating an ideal
joint/service balanced culture and Naval culture. This
background provides the setting for an analysis of GNA.
Interviews conducted by the author with key individuals
involved in the writing and implementation of GNA
legislation, coupled with a review of the literature,
provide the basis for understanding the intent behind GNA
and its provisions. The interviews were conducted between
May and November 1991 and included: 1.) three members of the
House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Rep. Ike Skelton (D-
3 Congress, House, Panel on Military Education Report, 100th Cong., 1st
sess. , 21 April 1989, 57.
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MO), Chairman of the House Panel on Military Education, Rep.
Nicholas Mavroules (D-MA), Chairman of the House Armed
Services Investigative Subcommittee, and Rep. John R. Kasich
(R-OH); 2.) two primary drafters of GNA - Dr. Archie
Barrett, professional staff member HASC, and James R. Locher
III, former Senate Armed Services Committee professional
staff member and currently Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; and 3.)
active duty military officers serving on the Joint Staff,
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and on the Navy
staff. This latter group included VADM M. Boorda, then
Chief of Naval Personnel and RADM James Cossey, Assistant
Deputy CNO for Operations, Plans, and Policy (OP-06B).
In assessing the effectiveness of GNA, the focus was on
three areas: operations, plans, and people, and how the key
power mechanisms impacted these areas. This assessment was
based on written material, interviews, DOD reports, and
external reviews (GAO reports and Congressional
hearings/reports).
The thesis is organized into eight chapters. Following
this, Chapter II presents a model of Navy culture along
historical, environmental, and sociological dimensions.
Chapter III is a history of United States defense reforms,
which also serves to highlight unique aspects of Navy
culture. Chapter IV presents a history of the GNA,
including an emphasis on its unique characteristics.
3
Chapter V enumerates the key factors of GNA that potentially
affect the balance of institutional power. The provisions
of the criginal GNA, legislated changes, and problems of
interpretation provide the basis for this theoretical
presentation. Chapter VI assesses the GNA in light of
changes in Navy culture and examines three areas of this
culture: operations, plans, and people. Chapter VII reviews
implications of present trends and patterns for future
national security, including policy recommendations for
improvements. Finally, Chapter VIII concludes with a




What makes an organization function? Simultaneously
capable of rationality and randomness, organizations are
invariably seen by "other" groups as parochial and self-
serving. This chapter offers an explanation for the
apparent illogical behavior of organizations by examining
the concept of organizational culture.4 This chapter also
defines the concept of organizational culture and relates it
to the United States Navy by delineating a Navy-specific
organizational culture.
B. CULTURE - OPERATIONALLY DEFINED
Consciously and unconsciously shaping the perceptual
lens of the organization, culture often underlies decisions
and actions. Culture provides a level of analysis rooted in
the identity of organizations.
Let there be no delusion. Even though they all
[individual military services] serve the same common
purpose and do so in all the honesty and sincerity
4This is but one level of analysis, others being the rational actor model
and the bureaucratic politics model. See for example, Graham T. Allison,
Essence of Decision: Exolainina the Cuban Missile Crisis (Glenview, IL:
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1971). In all situations causation is not
clearcut. Often, true behavioral explanations and future predictive value is
best offered by a blend of competing levels. However, for the sake of
rigidity and coherent analysis, adherence to a specific conceptual model is
preferable. It is the author's contention that the cultural level represents
a powerful and underdeveloped level of analysis.
5
of able and dedicated men, they do not think
alike.'
Much of the context of our received
wisdom... reflects little more than the
character.. .of our own culture.6
Despite the logical wrappings of defense planning,
there is considerable evidence that the qualities of
the United States military forces are determined
more by cultural and institutional preferences for
certain kinds of military forces than by the
"threat" .
We could not begin thinking our strategic problems
completely anew, but must be bound by our
inheritance from the strategic thinking of the
past.6
What does the concept of organizational culture mean? One
text refers to it as "the prevalent patterns of activities,
interactions, norms, values, attitudes, and feelings.
Culture includes the informal aspects of organizational life
as well as the formal. "9 Edgar H. Schein in his book,
Organizational Culture and Leadership, describes
organizational culture as the "pattern of basic
assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed by a given
group as it learns to cope with its problems of external
5j. C. Wylie, Rear Admiral, USN, Military Strategy: A General Theory of
Power Control (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1967), 150.
6Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strate-v and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton
Press, 1986), xi.
7 Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy
and Analysis (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989), 6.
aBernard Brodie as quoted in Russell F. Weigly, The American Way of War:
A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1973), 432.
9James A. F. Stoner and R. Edward Freeman, Management, 4th ed. (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 375.
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adaption and internal integration - that has worked well
enough to be considered valid, and therefore, to be taught
to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and
feel in relation to those problems. °10 Colin Gray
describes a variant of organizational culture - the national
strategic culture:
It is hypothesized here that there is a discernable
U.S. strategic culture - that culture, referring to
modes of thought and action with respect to force,
derives from perception of the national historical
experience, from aspirations for responsible
behavior in national terms, and from all of the many
distinctly American experiences (which stem from
geography, political philosophy, and practice-i.e.,
civic culture-and way of life) that determine a U.S.
citizen. The idea of a U.S. national style derives
from the idea of a U.S. strategic culture,
suggesting that there is a distinctly American way
in strategic matters."
Colin Gray's ideas may be applied at the military service
level by hypothesizing that unique individual military
service cultures exist and, additionally, by focusing on
this culture one can better understand the motivations,
aspirations, and proclivities of the individual services.
Frederick Downey and Steven Metz state that the "sensitivity
of the military strategist to political culture helps
determine the eventual acceptability of his product." 2 A
sensitivity for service culture amongst both military and
10Edgar H. Schein, Oraanizational Culture and Leadership (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1985), 9.
"Gray, 36.
12Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture
and Strategic Planning,* Parameters, September 1988, 35.
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political leaders would enhance interservice cooperation and
hence national security. This point is underscored by
Carnes Lord who states, "the rivalry of separate military
organizations and services.. .can greatly affect the
formulation and implementation of military strategy." 13
The following definition of organizational culture is
developed for this study:
Organizational culture consists of shared
assumptions learned by a group in response to its
historical adaptation and development. These
assumptions form discernable patterns which often
operate below the level of consciousness. 4
Such assumptions elicit nearly automatic group responses to
external and internal issues of survival. John Shy
highlights the importance of learning theory with respect to
conditioned response, stating that "in the future we must
ask more seriously than before to what extent they are
dealing with learned responses which operate beneath the
full level of consciousness." s5 Because they constitute
the most fundamental level of human consciousness, these
core assumptions, which form the basis of the learned
responses, are difficult to determine and analyze.
13Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, vol.
5. no. 3, 1985, 274.
14 This definition is the author's owm and reflects a blend of both the
definition offered by Stoner and Schein.
15John Shy, "The American Military Experience: History and Learning," The
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 1, no. 2, (Winter 1971), 226.
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Therefore, most studies examine the product of these
assumptions in the form of observable values and behavior.
Determining the link between cultural assumptions and
observable behavior is often circuitous. What comes first,
the assumption or the behavior? How are the two related in
shaping the dynamic nature of culture? Schein describes the
process of cultural analysis as a "step of examining the
shared assumptions" in the system.6 The examination of
shared assumptions is fraught with pitfalls, alternative
explanations, and levels of analysis problems.
Differentiation between the levels of culture helps
avoid these pitfalls. Schein outlines three levels of
culture. First, artifacts are the creations of the group,
whereby the culture is revealed through externally
observable phenomena such as physical space, language,
products, uniforms, and organizational structure. Values
constitute the second level and reflect the outward
manifestation of the beliefs17 and core assumptions the
group holds. As the values begin to be taken for granted,
they gradually become beliefs and assumptions - dropping out
of consciousness. "Many values remain conscious and are
explicitly articulated because they serve the normative or
16Schein, 3.
1 The terms beliefs and assumptions are used interchangeably in this
paper.
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moral function of guiding members of the group in how to
deal with certain key situations.1118
The third level consists of core assumptions. These
constitute the basis for the group's, and hence the
individual member's, existence. There is little variation
in basic assumptions, and output behaviors are only
conceivable based on this subconscious level. The core
level of assumptions provides the foundation for the group,
thus shaping the group's values, perceptions, and behavior.
Because assumptions represent the underlying basis for the
group's unity and purpose, they become difficult to
change. 9 Actions which seem inconsistent with the
assumptions may not reflect real changes, but rather
reactions to contingency changes in the external or internal
environment. Ultimately the group will act to ensure its
survival while struggling to justify survival-based
decisions that may be at variance with basic beliefs.
Categorizing culture risks oversimplifying the
tremendous overlap between levels. If ideas and concepts
become assumptions, then periods of transition occur in
which they have not yet been assimilated into the group's
1'8Schein, 16.
19The three levels, artifacts, values, and assumptions, are adapted from
Schein, 14.
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beliefs.2' Full assimilation into the organization's
belief system ensures institutionalization of the assumption
for its members, in this way members are expected to
internalize the belief.22
The fact that large cultures, such as American society,
contain thousands of subcultures means generalization about
cultural assumptions are dangerous. Therefore, the number
of items which can realistically represent assumptions is
extremely small. The individual military services are
microcosms of American culture and in many respects harbor
the same basic assumptions. Yet, each individual service
has its own unique culture.22  Owing to the number and
diversity of subgroups within each of the services, the
20The cultural model adopted for this study is based on two levels: basic
assumptions and artifacts. The author believes that the distinction Schein
makes between values and assumptions is too fine. In many cases the cultural
values are subsumed in the assumptions. For a thorough discussion of beliefs
and learning theory, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperceotion in
International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976)
21This does not mean that the group and all members will always act
consistently with the core assumptions since there are other factors and
individual beliefs that come into play; only that there exist strong
tendencies for groups and the members of the associated groups to act
according to certain norms of behavior. Large inco ,uistencies between a
concept and the organization's culture might result in certain reactionary
behavior. Beliefs that are not fully internalized but rather simply
accommodated also exhibit the tendency to evoke culturally based behavioral
inconsistencies.
22Most studies focus on United States national culture or the national
strategic culture and only touch on service differences. For examples of the
national culture approach see Colin S. Gray, National Strategy and National
Style and "National Style in Strategy,' International Security, vol. 6, no.
2, Fall 1981, 21-47. Service-specific cultural studies include, Carl
Builder's seminal study, Masks of War, which distinguishes the services
according to differences in "practices, or the artifacts of culture; Vincent
Davis', The Admirals Lobby, which examines service cultural differences with
particular focus on political interaction: and LCOL C. Kenneth Allard's
Command, Control and the Common Defense which presents a hierarchy of
interrelated factors rooted in unique service cultures that exacerbate
problems of command and control.
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service-unique cultural assumptions must also be few and
specific. There exists the risk of ascribing assumed
beliefs to individuals or subgroups that, while
representative of overall group patterns, are alien to those
in question. This represents the challenge in identifying
the prevalent patterns while recognizing that behavioral
anomalies are often the result of genuinely distinct
individual or subgroup beliefs.
The organization's founder plays a key role in shaping
the culture. The behavioral patterns instilled in the early
stages of an organization become the basis for subsequent
cultural attributes.2" The heroes, rituals, and symbols
associated with these patterns define and shape the
organization.24  In the Navy, as this chapter and Chapter
III will demonstrate, the historical influence of early
leaders and the nature of operations at sea have contributed
to the formation of a distinct Navy subculture within the
overall military culture.
In analyzing organizational change, what is "defined as
'change' depends on immediate effects and what we expect or
hope for. "2s Change depends on perception. Expectation
23The role of the founder and subsequent leaders in this process is
essential, for they translate ideas into mission statements and operational
concepts - the guiding principles behind forming organizational essence.
24Stephen P. Robbins, ed., Organizational Behavior, 4ed. (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 473.
25Schein, 298.
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that change was intended by a given action can be self-
fulfilling. For example, Edgar Schein states that
"politicians who have promised to make changes find all
kinds of evidence of change, while entrenched conservatives
find all kinds of evidence of stability in those areas for
which they want credit."26 Recognition that change was
intended is an important element in determining the outcome
of actions that initiated change.
The impetus for change can be external or internal to
the organization. External, environmental crises arising
from economic or national security threats often stimulate
revolutionary change. On the other hand, both deliberate,
external and internal actions are used to manage change
through processes, programs, or leadership initiatives.
While all change is motivated by some force,27 there are
also forces acting to resist change. The forces for change
and those for the status quo encompass the basic opposing
sides on change-related issues.28
Methods of changing organizations include: structural
change in which reporting relations, control spans,
functional alignments, and centralized/decentralized





workplace efficiency is analyzed and refined, and people-
related change in which behavior, skills, attitudes,
perceptions, and expectations are the focus of change.29
The type, degree, and method of change are dependent on the
desired result and the timeframe in which the change is
required. People-related methods for changing organizations
are generally longer-term.
Implementing people-related organizational change
encompasses a wide range of behavioral fields and management
strategies. The understanding of organizational culture is
essential in this area.
Culture solves problems for the group or
organization, and, even more important, it contains
and reduces anxiety... culture gives a group its
character, and that character serves for the group
the function that character and defense mechanisms
serve for the individual. Learning theory,
psychoanalytical theory, and sociodynamic theory
are, therefore, elements that need to be brought
together with leadership theory into a dynamic model
of culture.3"
Specific implementing methods for cultural-based change
include organizational development processes, training and
education programs, and reward systems. Both educational
programs and promotion schemes are tools fcr altering
expectations and beliefs. These mechanisms are examples of
people-related organizational change techniques, which, as




The next section draws upon theoretical literature,
expert opinion, and the author's analysis and experience to
develop an operational concept of U.S. Navy culture by
exposing the underlying assumptions. Since "organizational
artifacts are better used to check one's hypothesis about
basic assumptions than to decipher what thosc assumptions
are,"31 the operational definition of culture is reinforced
in Chapter III by an historical review of defense reforms in
the United States.
C. NAVY CULTURE OPERATIONALIZED
The fundamental assumption underlying the United States
Navy's organizational culturc is the belief in naval
autonomy. This is reflected in the historical,
environmental, and social dimensions of the United States'
naval experience. Examining the unique Navy experience with
respect to these dimensions reinforces the case for the
existence of a specific Navy style - a derivative of its
service-specific culture.
Historically, the U.S. Navy is steeped in tradition
based on wartime success and British origins. In the
environmental dimension, naval units, groups, and task
forces operate in all physical mediums, air, land, sea, and
undersea, with their own army, air, and strategic forces.
Socially, the nature of command at sea and its relationship
3 Schein, 127.
15
to a belief in decentralized control provides individual
U.S. Naval commanders power unequaled among Army and Air
Force contemporaries.
Identifying the fundamental Naval cultural assumption as
autonomy does not mean that other cultural assumptions are
absent. The identification of a single cultural assumption
serves to illustrate the most unique aspects of U.S. Naval
culture, which leads to values and artifactual differences
which set the Navy apart from the other services and the
national culture.
The unique position of the Navy is illuminated in
numerous statements by DOD and other government officials.
For example, General David C. Jones, USAF, former Chairman
nf the Joint Chiefs of Staff, characterized the Navy as:
... the most strategically independent of the
services - it has its own army, navy, and air force.
It is the least dependent on the others. It would
prefer to be given a mission, retain complete
control over all assets, and be left alone.32
In a Washington Post article rebutting Secretary of the Navy
John Lehman's views concerning the ongoing defense reform
debate, Congressman Ike Skelton stated:
In all honesty, it should be noted that as a service
the Navy is unique. It has its own air force, its
carrier air wings; its own ground forces, the Marine
Corps; and of course its own warships3
32David C. Jones, Gen., USAF (ret.), "What's Wrong With Our Defense
Establishment," New York Times Magazine, 7 November 1982, 84.
33Ike Skelton, 'We're Not Trying To Be Prussians,, Washington Post, 16
June 1984, 13.
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Congressman Skelton's analysis turned into an indictment
when he equated Secretary Lehman's opposition to reform
proposals as "the Navy's traditional reluctance to play on
the team.",34 This attitude is prevalent among government,
military, and Department of Defense officials. The
following comments from my interviews are typical: "the Navy
has always been a reluctant partner [in joint matters]"
..."the other services view us as isolationists - and that
is a view which is not entirely incorrect".. ."the Navy
historically doesn't change anything that they don't have
to"...and "there is just something different about the
Navy".35 Unfortunately, when these views are combined with
the Navy's record of opposition to every defense reform
proposal since the National Security Act of 1947, the
inevitable conclusion leads to Navy isolationism and
obstructionism. The perception of the Navy as different has
grown to become a reality. This perception of the Navy
which, in part, emanated from the defense reform debates,
has clouded the principal reason for the Navy's uniqueness -
its culture.
Vincent Davis in The Admirals Lobby, examines the social
behavior of the U.S. military, particularly the Navy. His
work was motivated by the "primary conviction that the
34Skelton, 13.
3These statements are based on a number of interviews conducted by the
author in the summer of 1991.
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nature and employment of armed forces.. .would be to a large
degree determined by the nature and culture of that
nation." 36 He concludes that "the officer corps of each
American military service may appropriately be regarded as a
distinctive subculture within the overall American political
culture." The Navy, in particular, has manifested certain
"distinctive" patterns of behavior.37 Davis traces these
patterns to factors rooted in pre-World War II service
history, including a sense of isolation from society and its
political processes, the difficulty coping with
technological change, and reluctance to get involved in
politicking.38
One internal Navy study conducted in 1958 by RADM Allan
L. Reed of OP-92 (intelligence) sought to ascertain why the
Navy seemed so defensive in the unification debates. The
conclusions uncover some revealing aspects of the Navy's
culture.
The habit of thinking of naval officers has always
been more individualistic than of officers in the
other services. This makes for vigor in action and
produces good ideas, but it.. .tends to inhibit
teamwork and support of officially stated policies
and doctrines necessary in the highest staffs
... Naval officers in general do not consider it an
honor to be assigned to the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations.. .The degree of identification with
36Vincent Davis, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 1967), vii.
37Davis, 315.
3 Davis, 23 and 215.
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special interests, such as Naval aviation, the
submarine service, or surface specialties tends to
encourage formation of cliques and to discourage
viewpoints and thinking orientated toward the best
interests of the Navy as a whole.39
Any one of the military services could similarly stake a
claim to uniqueness and thereby generate a self-confident
belief in autonomy.4" With this consideration, it may not
be what is factual, but what is perceived. One study which
examines the differences between types of warfare concludes
that the uniqueness of naval warfare is not so much real as
perceived.4" The same could be said of the organizations
that conduct this warfare. However, differences between the
services exist and understanding these differences may
change perceptions which have become reinforced by
observable behavior instead of the more revealing, yet
elusive, underlying assumptions.
The question of what the Navy is and what it's all about
is inextricably linked to its historical roots. Like
39A. L. Reed, RADM, "Staff Study on Organization of the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations," Department of the Navy, as quoted in Thomas C.
Hone, Power and Chanae: The Administrative History of tne Office of the Chief
of Naval Ooeations 1946-1986 (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center,
Department of the Navy, 1989), 44.
40The key point here is that when examining one of the major concerns of
this thesis, power sharing, perceptions are an important consideration. Dr.
Robert Jervis states that people tend to fit incoming information into pre-
existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there., Jervis, 143.
A recent study of organizational culture *shows shared perceptions of daily
practices to be the core of an organization's culture." Geert Hofstede and
others, "Measuring Organizational Cultures: A Qualitative and Quantitative
Study Across Twenty Cases," Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 35, 1990,
311.
42James J. Tritten, "Is Naval Warfare Unique?,* The Journal of Strateaic
Studies, vol. 12, no. 4, (December 1989), 504.
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American society, the U.S. Navy emerged victorious from
beneath the shadow of Great Britain. Carl Builder asks,
"Who is the Navy?"
It is the supranational institution that has
inherited the British Navy's throne to naval
supremacy. What is it about? It is about
preserving and wielding sea power as the most
important and flexible kind of military power for
America as a maritime nation. The means to those
ends are the institution and its traditions, both of
which provide for a permanence beyond the people who
serve them.42
The example of British supremacy at sea inspired the United
States Navy. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson once
remarked, "the admirals were wrapped up in a 'peculiar
psychology' in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and
the United States Navy the only true church."'3 If this is
the case, then Admiral Horatio Nelson is the guiding spirit.
Nelson's inspired victories epitomize the individual daring
and initiative so highly regarded as essential elements in
naval operations and naval officers." Dr. Michael Palmer
illustrates the historical similarities between the
decentralized style of operations championed by the
aggressive leadership of Admiral Nelson and the style used
by Admiral Arleigh Burke in World War II.
42Builder, 32.
43Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War
(New York: Harper Bros., 1947), 506 as quoted in Builder, 18.
44Geoffrey Bennett, Nelson The Commander (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1972), 98.
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The comparison of the methods of Nelson and Burke
reveals that these two successful commanders learned
similar lessons from their early combat experiences.
They shunned centralization and came to believe that
delegation of authority, that is, decentralization
of command, offered the best hope of enhancing
fighting power and achieving victory. They did so
during periods when much-heralded communications
technology seemed to offer the prospect of ever
greater centralized control.4"
The Navy has embraced decentralized operations. The
examples of Admiral Nelson and the World War II heroics of
Admiral Burke, coupled with his leadership of the Navy in
the 1950s, went far to institutionalize this concept.4
Unification of the services runs counter to these historical
roots of the Navy. Clearly, Admiral Burke used this
argument as a Navy captain in OPNAV, tasked to write
proposals countering unification efforts and later as CNO,
when he unsuccessfully fought President Eisenhower's
reforms."7
The Constitution reflects the institutional importance
attributed to naval power by providing for the "maintenance"
of a navy while calling for the "raising" of armies. The
necessity of maintaining a fleet originated from both the
historical experience-and geographical situation of the
United States.
45Michael A. Palmer, Dr., *Burke and Nelson: Decentralized Style of
Command," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1991, 59.
4" Heroes are persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, who possess




The second dimension of the United States Navy's
culture, the environmental dimension, has shaped the Navy
and the nature of its forces. As an island nation, the sea
has historically provided life or portended death for the
United States. The geographic isolation of the United
States influenced the authors of the Federalist Papers. It
was envisioned that the Navy would play the keystone role in
defense and growth of the Union. Alexander Hamilton writes
that "every institution will grow and flourish in proportion
to the quality and extent of the means concentrated towards
its [the Navy's] formation and support., 48 In contrast
armies were regarded with suspicion. Hamilton writes that
"the industries and habits of the people of the present day,
absorbed in the pursuits of gain and devoted to improvements
of agriculture and commerce, are incompatible with the
condition of a nation of soldiers.",49
The Navy possesses all the elements and instruments of
an independent military power. Furthermore, only the Navy
operates warships and submarines at sea, operations which by
the nature of the medium have different characteristics and
objectives. "States conduct war on the land in order to
achieve long-term political control over territory. Warfare
at sea, on the other hand, is concerned with temporary
48Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 11.
49Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 11.
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control over, or denial of use by the adversary of, sea
areas for influencing what is taking place on land.,"
Ships operating at sea are physically cut off from land
and remain tethered only by their dependence on support
vessels. The stability and safety of the vessel demand
attention and respect. Ships take on personalities
reflecting this relationship. The dependence a sailor
develops on his ship transcends a mere fascination for toys,
touching the roots of sociological bonding. This survival
relationship is the essence of naval autonomy. The
endearment toward the ship more aptly characterizes the
Navy's "altar of worship," rather than simply tradition as
Carl Builder suggests.51 Belief in the ship fosters a
sense of superiority over the environment, thereby
reinforcing concepts of autonomy. Furthermore, ships at sea
operate at near-wartime tempo. The continuous operations
and close integration with the environment are factors
unique to the Navy.
The geographic necessity and isolated, autonomous
operations of the Navy were more unique before the added
variables of aerospace power and nuclear weapons. These
technologies challenged the Navy's organizational survival
50James J. Tritten, "Are Naval Operations Unique?' Naval Forces, no. 5,
(1986), 25. Quoted in William R. Blackburn, CDR, USN, The Navy in the Joint
Arena: Antagonist or Team Player? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War
College, 31 March 1989), 11.
51Builder, 18.
23
by radically altering the environmental aspects of time and
space.
The sociological dimension is the third aspect of United
States Navy culture. The Navy's deep historical roots and
unique man/machine/environment synergism provide the context
for its sociological underpinnings. The interaction of
people in the Navy entails a set of priorities and unwritten
rules different from the other services. This uniqueness is
reflected in the relative emphasis placed on promotional
milestones, education, operations, and planning processes in
the Navy. 2  Individual identity within the Naval
organization is reinforced by the power bestowed on the
commanding officers of ships at sea and the emphasis placed
on subgroups within the Navy, such as the submarine, air,
and surface communities. 3  These relationships create a
tremendous pride both for the Navy and for the identity
within the Navy. The relationship between this pride, the
Navy's storied past, and its supremacy over the environment
is self-reinforcing. Since 1945, in the absence of a major
"blue-water" challenge for the Navy, organizational defeats
52This translates into a warrior (operational) versus staff focus. For
comparative statistics on promotional data see appendix D of the Annual
Secretary of Defense Posture Statements for FY 1991 and 1992 and appendix A
of this study. The Navy contrasts sharply with the Army and Air Force in
that the Navy places more emphasis on operations in promotions and career
progression. The small physical confines of ships have necessitated small
staff sizes. Chapter VI will expand on these comparisons.
53Of all the services, the Navy has perhaps the most unique and
distinctive subcultures within its overall organizational culture. This
contributes to emphasis on decentralization as a format for satisfying
subculture identity.
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at home, in the form of perceived losses in battles over
defense reforms, have evoked a culturally based response of
wounded pride. The outward manifestation of this has been
the view that the Navy fails to play on the team and is
obstructionist.
The next chapter illustrates how differences in service
preferences, which surface as interservice rivalry, can be
partially explained by service culture. The accepted notion
is that the military services act according to parochial
interests. While this may be true in some cases, historical
patterns reveal consistencies in thought which transcend
mere parochialism. Belief in the organization is paramount
and fosters action to ensure survival and health. New
situations and challenges are handled within the bounds of
organizational culture. While the wrappings may change to
fit the situation, the basic tenets which represent the
essence of the organization are consistent.
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III. DEFENSE REFORM HISTORY
A. PRE-WORLD WAR II
The Department of War and the Department of the Navy
were created in 1789 and 1798, respectively, with grave
reservations and only to provide for national security.
James Madison states:
A standing force... is a dangerous, at the same time
that it may be necessary, provision.. .A wise nation
will combine all these considerations; and, whilst
it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource
which may become essential to its safety, will exert
all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity
and the danger of resorting to one which may be
inauspicious to its liberties.5 4
The Constitution cemented these feelings of mistrust."
Necessity and control were clearly more important than
efficiency and military power. The resulting military
forces were ill-prepared for integrated operations
necessitated by America's growing expansionist spirit.5 6
The Spanish-American War demonstrated these shortcomings.
54James Madison in Federalist Paper No. 41.
SsBy providing for dual, civilian control of the military through the
President as Commander in Chief (Article II, section 2) and the Congress in
charge of the resources (Article I, section 8), the authors of the
Constitution sought to institutionalize civilian control of the military.
56The Monroe Doctrine issued in 1823 signaled a change in America's
isolationist policies. The decades following this, particularly the 1890s,
marked the beginning of expansionist policies with U.S. involvement in the
Philippines, Cuba, and Panama. President T. Roosevelt propelled this forward
with the around the world cruise of the Great White Fleet.
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The Spanish-American War, particularly the Cuban
campaign, demonstrated serious deficiencies in the
performance of the U.S. military establishment in
both operational and administrative areas. The
utter failure of the Army and Navy to cooperate in
Cuba was the forerunner of inter-service bickering
and uncoordination during World War II, the Vietnam
War, the seizure of the Pueblo, the Iranian rescue
mission, and the Grenada incursion.57
Despite such shortcomings the United States Army and Navy
continued relatively independent operations and planning
until World War II.58
The Pearl Harbor debacle suggests the adverse impact of
this system of interservice coordination. Rep. George H.
Bender highlights the perceived deficiencies in the Pearl
Harbor command structure: "It would seem obvious after Pearl
Harbor that the division of authority prevalent there was a
large contributing factor in the losses sustained in our
fleet.",59 Until then the state of technology had permitted
virtually autonomous existence for the two services without
adverse operational impact. As uses of air power, rapid
communications, and the U.S. military's global reach
5 Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization:
The Need For Change, staff report, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 1985, 633.
58There were some attempts at unifying the services prior to World War
II, notably a proposal forwarded in the inter-war period that had limited
Navy support. None of these proposals were enacted because there was a lack
of constituency, demonstrated need, and fear of a powerful military. See,
Defense Organization: The Need For Change, 49 and Davis, 13-24.
S9Conaressional Record vol. 88, part 1. 12 Jan. 1942, 251-252. As quoted
in Gordon W. Prange, Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1986), 434. See, also Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and
Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962). Wohlstetter's book
also highlights the deficiencies of the Joint board which was a
"consultative* vice executive body. 254.
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simultaneously expanded, the boundaries between operational
theaters blurred. Rapid response became a necessity. There
was no longer time to craft ad-hoc command arrangements.
These trends necessitated improved inter-service cooperation
and joint efforts. For the post-war Navy this translated
into heated debate about the unification of the services.
At stake for the Navy was the future of naval aviation and
more fundamentally, the organizational survival of the
service.
B. WORLD WAR II
Reorganization movements designed to institutionalize a
unified service began in the latter part of World War II.
The concept of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) originated in
World War II when President Franklin D. Roosevelt formed the
JCS as a replacement for the Joint Board of the Army and
Navy which had functioned as an inter-service planning board
and provided American representatives to the combined Chiefs
of Staff.6" The success of the war ensured that some form
of the Joint Staff (JS) system would remain in place.
Post-war reorganization proposals were dominated by two
views. The Army and its nascent Air Corps favored strong
centralization and unification under a single military
department. The Navy opposed this view. The Navy perceived
"0Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff the First Twenty - five
Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 14.
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Army proposals as an erosion of its power. Centralization
of the military by creating a single department, it was
thought, would hinder naval operations by unduly
constraining the required decentralized type of control so
essential for success. Furthermore, the proposed creation
of the Air Force provided a direct challenge to the Navy's
autonomous viewpoints, particularly with regard to the
control and operation of air power. Instead the Navy
favored a structure that would ensure its autonomy and
departmental stature.
C. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 (NSA)
Realizing the inevitability of some type of unification,
the Navy took the initiative in presenting an acceptable
compromise to the Administration and Congress. James
Forrestal, the Secretary of the Navy, skillfully used a Navy
initiated study by Ferdinand Eberstadt6 to convince pro-
Navy allies on the Senate Naval Affairs Committee to support
the Navy compromise, despite Army and Presidential desires
for even more unification.62 The compromise, in substance,
reflected most of the Navy's proposals. The Navy won the
1947 battle but lost the reorganization wars because the
National Security Act of 1947 (NSA) created precedent
61Ferdinand Eberstadt, Report on the Unification of the War and Navv
Departments to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, 79th Congress, 1945.
62Hone, 16.
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towards centralization. By taking initiative on a subject
the Navy abhorred, unification, it paradoxically facilitated
the trend towards more of the same. Consequently, future
Navy positions on service unification would be less
forthcoming and characterized by foot dragging rather than
enlightened leadership of the issues.63
The NSA created a Secretary of Defense as the head of a
National Military Establishment, formally established the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and created the Department of the Air
Force. While the NSA forged mechanisms for inter-service
coordination, it left the services considerable power by
neglecting the burgeoning issue of roles and missions. Each
Executive Military Department possessed virtual autonomy,
with powerful individual service secretaries retaining
cabinet level stature. The balance of power between service
and joint institutions remained heavily tilted in favor of
the services. On the one hand, the Navy felt that a strong
service-oriented balance favored its type of operations and
style. The Army, however, saw an enhanced joint institution
as a way of strengthening its organizational stature, since
Army operations are highly dependent on the other services.
63The success of the wartime JCS, the outcry over the Pearl Harbor
disaster, and the emergence of a strong Army Air Corps clamoring for
independence made some type of unification inevitable. The Navy took
initiative to shape this unification as favorably as possible. It succeeded
in maintaining its independent departmental stature against Army wishes.
However, Lhe Air Force was created over Navy objections and the
institutionalization of the JCS concept created a baseline from which future
reforms would grow even more centralized.
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In the "absence of real global conflict", the services
carried out a "surrogate war '4 for institutional survival.
To understand how and why this surrogate battle was fought,
it is necessary to examine the roots of the post - World War
II national security structure and inter-service power
balance.
World War II ended amidst a heated controversy over
service roles and missions. Some scholars attribute the
dispute about service unification and roles and missions to
the "uncertainties created by technological change."
T.chnological change was certainly one of the primary
catalysts in the debate. However, the reasons why
technology stimulated feelings of paranoia in the Navy go
deeper, reflecting the challenge posed to the Navy's
organizational survival by the sense of having lost the
preeminent spot in U.S. national security after, in the
Navy's view, having personally won World War II. The Navy
was grappling with the paradox posed by great wartime
success and rapid technological advance which seemingly
rendered their experiences in the war meaningless. Steven
Miller observes:
The Navy emerged from the war, however, not only
triumphant but also troubled. At the moment of its
64David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," International Security,
vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983) 25.
6SHone, 17. Also see Gen. Nathan F. Twining, USAF (ret.), Neither
Liberty nor Safety, (New York: Holt, Rinehart,and Winston, 1966), 31.
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greatest success, the Navy embarked on one of the
most difficult half-decades in its modern history, a
period in which its strength was drastically
reduced, its command fired, and its contribution to
the national security questioned."
Nuclear weapons changed the thinking and approach to
warfare, creating confusion and uncertainty about
traditional methods of waging war. Possessing the bomb
bestowed prestige, preeminence, and programs on the
immediate post-war Air Force. "The new Air Force recognized
the bomb to be their strongest bargaining card and played it
for all it was worth, carefully fudging the question of
whether the vast destructive power concentrated in a single
device ought really to allow for contraction... in numbers of
aircraft."'67 The real lessons of World War II, with
respect to strategic bombing effectiveness, were not lost on
the Army and Navy. The Strategic Bombing Survey indicated
the mixed effectiveness of bombing, with problems ranging
from poor accuracy to inflated bomb damage assessments. 68
Despite the analytical results, the lessons of World War II
went ignored, the awesome power of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
silenced criticism of strategic bombing. Only "the
inquiring scholar or the parochial Army or Navy man"
66Steven E. Miller, "Rough Sailing: The U.S. Navy in the Nuclear Age,'
Michael Mandelbaum, ed., America's Defense, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989),
196.
67Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1981), 29.
6Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Oxford University Press,
1987), 24.
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questioned its true effectiveness.69 With post-war
demobilization drastically reducing the Navy's funds, and
the newly created Air Force perceived as the darling of the
national security establishment, the Navy desperately fought
for its secure niche.70
D. KEY WEST AGREEMENT
In March 1948 James Forrestal, now serving as the first
Secretary of Defense, gathered his service chiefs in Key
West, Florida and hammered out the Key West Agreement,
officially titled, "The Functions of the Armed Forces and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Most of the provisions of the
Key West Agreement remain embodied in DOD instruction
5100.1, "Functions of DOD and its major components." This
compromise remains today as one of the most powerful
determinants of service roles and missions.7" The
agreement is testimony to the military's recognition of both
the need to resolve inter-service differences and the
difficulty in deciding how. Within a month following the
Agreement, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, CNO, sent a memo to
69Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace 1939-1945, as quoted
in Freedman, 23.
70All services were severely impacted by post-war demobilization. The
Air Force, however, was the least affected. Newly forged trans-oceanic ties
necessitated commercial air power. This reinforced positive public
perception concerning air power. The spillover from this development helped
to enhance the Air Force's stature relative to the other services.
71Mortin H. and David Halperin, 'Rewriting the Key West Accord,, in
Reorganizina America's Defense Leadership in War and Peace, ed. Robert J.
Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-
Brassey's, 1985), 344.
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Secretary Forrestal seeking to clarify the Agreement. He
stated that the "joint war plans would soon recognize and
exploit the ability of carrier aircraft 'in the near future'
to deliver atomic bombing attacks. 72  This argument
countered the division of responsibility assigned in the Key
West Agreements which delegated the strategic air role to
the Air Force. Although it signed the Key West Agreements
"the Navy had little intention of abiding by the Key West
Agreements which in reality had provided the wedge it
desired. ,"73
E. 1949 AMENDMENT TO THE NSA
Frustrated over his inability to control the military
establishment, Secretary of Defense Forrestal 4 pushed for
further change. President Harry S. Truman, supportive of
efforts to unify the military, tasked the Hoover Commission
with investigating ways to improve the national security
process. The Hoover Commission's recommendations supported
Forrestal's conviction that further centralization was
necessary. The 1949 Amendment created the Department of
72John T. Greenwood, 'The Emergence of the Postwar Strategic Air Force,,
as printed in Air Power and Warfare: The Proceedings of the 8th Military
History Symposium United States Air Force Academy, Alfred F. Hurley, COL,
USAF and Robert C. Ehrhart, MAJ, USAF, editors, 18-20 October 1978, 233.
73Greenwood in Hurley, 233.
74Secretary Forrestal resigned on 2 March 1949, his resignation possibly
helped spur the subsequent passage of the Amendment to the National Security
Act in August 1949. Some argue that the pressures of the job combined with
his lack of statutory power and conflicts between having previously been
SECNAV were factors in his resignation.
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Defense, consolidated power in the office of the Secretary
of Defense, appointed the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (CJCS) - albeit with nonvoting status, and removed
the executive status of the military departments by
subordinating them to the Secretary of Defense.
The Navy vehemently resisted the 1949 Amendment. Naval
leadership perceived Secretary Forrestal to be "behaving
more like an enemy."75 The Navy reacted by forming a new
division, the Organizational Research and Policy Division
(OP-23). "The head of the new division, Captain Arleigh
Burke, who was charged with countering arguments favoring
service unification, eventually became one of the most
articulate spokesmen for the Navy's views on defense
organization. ,,76
OP-23's arguments in 1949 formed the basis for the
Navy's later positions toward the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Defense Department. The Navy
suspected that both institutions were following a
long-term strategy to strip the Navy of its
independence and to overcentralize the military
leadership of the country. OP-23 memos presented an
argument familiar to readers of James Madison's
Federalist Paper No. 10: competition among
factions...was beneficial because it allowed
civilians both to retain control of the military and
to consider alternative national military
strategies. Burke carried that view.. .with him into
office when he became CNO in 1955. 77
75Hone, 23. The Navy loses again as the ex-Secretary of the Navy




The Navy tried to stem the tide toward unification, but
lost. The Executive Branch again demonstrated a willingness
to support service unification while Congress became a
partner in legislating service cooperation.
The Navy's nadir in power occurred during the revolt of
the Admirals in 1949 when two issues triggered the
resignation and firing of the Navy's top leadership.78 The
first was the cancellation of the supercarrier United States
because the new Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson, felt
that:
The newly created North Atlantic Alliance gave the
Strategic Air Command access to bases in England
from which its bombers could reach targets within
the Soviet Union. Publicly, Johnson claimed that
the country could not afford such large ships and
their accompanying air groups.'9
Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan "resigned in anger"
over the cancellation of the carrier.8°
The second issue arose when the new Secretary of the
Navy, Francis P. Matthews, fired Admiral Louis E. Denfeld,
Chief of Naval Operations, because Denfeld gave testimony
78Paul R. Schratz, CAPT, USN (ret.), *The Admiral's Revolt,' United
States Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1986, 65.
79Hone, 24.
BSchratz, 68. The B-36 hearings provided the focal point for the
ensuing conflict as the Navy tried to expose flaws in the Air Force's pet
project, the B-36. Some felt that the Navy was still sore over the
cancellation of their coveted carrier. Public opinion clearly sided with the
Air Force. 'A Gallop poll conducted during the hearings on 15 October 1949
found an overwhelming 74% of voters favoring the Air Force in future war,
with only 6% the Army and 4% the Navy.,
36
that conflicted with Matthews' views before the House Armed
Services Committee during the 1949 Unification Hearings.
The cancellation of the carrier and the perceived
sellout by the civilian leadership of the Navy's position on
unification posed a serious threat to the organizational
survival of the Navy. Like Secretary Sullivan before him,
the frustrated, discouraged, and angered Admiral Denfeld
refused to compromise his beliefs.81
The Korean War arrested the Navy's organizational power
dive by demonstrating that limited wars without the use of
nuclear weapons were possible. The overall defense budget
soared, and the Navy benefitted through the funding of
additional ships, particularly aircraft carriers. While the
Navy's struggle for missions was partially alleviated, the
Air Force still controlled the national security picture
with over 37% of the total defense budget and the
preponderance of nuclear weapons.82 The creation of the
Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1946 had institutionalized
Air Force domination within the nuclear weapons arena. The
Berlin crisis (1948), technological developments in nuclear
weaponry, and the rise of the powerful General Curtis LeMay
g'Schratz, 67. In addition, several other senior Naval officers were
"forced" into retirement. The 'intervention of President Harry S, Truman in
Captain Burke's behalf thwarted subsequent attempts to block his promotion to
RADM."
82U. S. Department of Defense, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense
1960, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 34. The
Navy and Army had approximately equal shares of the remaining funds.
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as SAC Commanding General contributed to SAC's (hence the
Air Forces's) preeminence.8"
F. REORGANIZATION PLAN 6
After assuming office on 20 January 1953, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower acted decisively on his campaign pledge
to improve DOD's organization. He sent a message to
Congress in April 1953 outlining Reorganization Proposal 6
which was based on the findings of the Rockefeller Committee
on Defense Reorganization. Congress failed to oppose the
Plan within sixty days; therefore on 30 June 1953 Plan 6
took effect.84 Plan 6 increased civilian control over the
military by concentrating power in the civilian service
secretaries. "A single line of authority ran from the
President to the Secretary of Defense and downward, with the
Secretary acting through service secretaries viewed as
'operating managers' and his 'principal advisors' ,,8 The
Chairman's position was strengthened by power to approve
appointments to the Joint Staff (JS). Additionally, the JCS
duties of the service chiefs were given statutory precedence
over their service duties.
83Rosenberg, 19.
84Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study
Chronoloay Function and Comparison of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Historical
Division Joint Secretariat (Washington, D.C., 1979), 101.
BsPaola E. Coletta, The United States Navy and Defense Unification 1947-
1953 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1981), 341.
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Predictably, the Navy resisted the changes. Admiral
Charles M. Cooke, former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Plans and Policy during World War II, testifying before
the House Committee on Government Services, stated that the
proposed Plan 6 would give the CJCS excessive power such
that the Chairman would acquire the attribute of an overall
"Chief of the General Staff.",86 "Admiral Carney (CNO)
responded to Plan 6 by becoming more aggressive in the Navy
Department and in the JCS. He perceived that the plan left
more authority in the hands of the service secretaries than
the average civilian appointee could handle."87
In the post-Korean War period President Eisenhower's
emphasis on efficiency drove reforms. The Army and Navy
believed that massive retaliation ignored the lessons of
Korea by concentrating on total war with the Soviets when
lesser conflicts were more likely. This dissatisfaction
contributed to their opposition of reform proposals which
seemed to emphasize efficiency against reality. More
fundamental to their arguments against massive retaliation
and defense reforms was the threat posed to organizational
survival by a lack of key roles in the national security
picture. In contrast, the Air Force continued to benefit
86Joint Chiefs of Staff Soecial Historical Study Chronoloqy and
Composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 107.
87Hone, 34.
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because of its virtual monopoly on nuclear weaponry and
related policies.
By the late 1950s the Navy had recovered from its 1949
lowpoint. Sputnik and the perceived ICBM gap shifted
concerns from massive retaliation and air power to ICBMs and
vulnerability.8 While neither the Air Force nor the Navy
embraced the emerging missile technology, both recognized
the necessity of staking a claim in this new mission area.
G. 1958 AMENDMENT TO THE NSA
President Eisenhower was a staunch advocate of
centralization and unification of the armed forces. His
January 1958 State of the Union address emphasized the need
to "assure ourselves that military organization facilitates
rather than hinders the functioning of the military
establishment in maintaining the security of the nation."89
Dissatisfied with the degree of inter-service cooperation,
planning, and resource allocation, he recognized that
advances in technology and nuclear weaponry presaged a
revolution in warfare. In a widely acclaimed speech to
Congress in April 1958 announcing his proposals, he stated:
88 The advent of missiles and other developments in national military
policy had become so disturbing to the descendants of Billy Mitchell that
Hanson W. Baldwin reported in the New York Times: 'The Air Force believes it
is fighting for the country's life, but it is also fighting for its own.' As
quoted in Davis, 228.
89Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study Chronoloqv and
Comoosition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 130.
40
Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone
forever. If ever again we should be involved in
war, we will fight it in all elements, with all
services, as one single concentrated effort.. .singly
led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of
service."
Despite naval opposition in the person of CNO Admiral
Arleigh Burke, Congress enacted President Eisenhower's
proposals by July 1958. The 1958 Amendment to the NSA
consolidated more power in both the Secretary of Defense and
the CJCS by streamlining the chain of command and removing
the service chief's operational authority. The revised
chain of command ran directly from the Secretary of Defense
through the JCS to the unified commanders.91 Additionally,
it expanded the size of the JS, empowered the Chairman to
assign JCS tasking, and permitted the Chairman a vote on JCS
* 92issues.
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 granted
unprecedented power to the Secretary of Defense,
particularly concerning his ability to realign
organizational structure. Understandably this did not sit
well with the Navy's preference for decentralized control
and autonomy.
90President Eisenhower as quoted in the Congressional Record, 99th
Congress, 3 October 1985, S12535.
9A Unified Command has forces assigned from two or more services,
whereas a Specified Command has forces from a single service only.
92Major William Caldwell USA and LCDR James K. Gruetzner USN, "DOD
Reorganization,* U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval Review 1987, 139.
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Shortly after the law's passage the Strategic Air
Command "took advantage of its provisions by requesting that
SAC be given operational control of the Navy's Polaris sub
force then under construction.. .over the next fifteen months
Burke stubbornly fought the proposal, not only within the
Joint Chiefs but before Congress and in the press."93
Preempting any SAC moves to consolidate power, the Navy
arranged for its own modified command structure which
recognized the importance and status of the growing
submarine fleet.94 The final organization devised to
coordinate strategic nuclear targeting, largely forced by
then Secretary of Defense Gates, represented a compromise
for both the Air Force and Navy. The Navy favored separate
control of their SSBNs with coordination and integration at
the JCS level, while the Air Force favored all functions at
the unified command level. The Joint Strategic Targeting
Planning Staff (JSTPS) would coordinate but not control
strategic nuclear targeting. The close alliance of JSTPS to
SAC, including the dual-hatted commander, ensured Air Force
domination. Force control and weapons employment, however,
would still be a unified command function. The differences
would be in targeting. In this area the Navy viewed itself
93David Allan Rosenberg, Arleigh Albert Burke, as quoted in Hone, 43.
94Hanson W. Baldwin, "Problems of Command: New Set-up for Submarines of
Atlantic Fleet Anticipates Strategic Decisions, New York Times, 6 August
1960, 7(A).
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the loser, having effectively relinquished direct control
over target selection. The Navy reluctantly accepted the
decision. "To Admiral Burke the setup looked like an Air
Force plot to deprive the Navy of control of its carriers
and Polaris submarines."9 S
H. PATTERNS OF REFORM
The NSA, Amendments of 1949 and 1958, and Plan 6 of 1953
all strengthened both civilian control and military
effectiveness by enhancing the statutory authority of the
Secretary of Defense and the CJCS. Concern for American
values reflects a duality which places emphasis on both
independence and efficiency. Consolidated civilian control
undoubtedly reflects "traditional" American fears of a
strong military, epitomized by the syndrome of a powerful
German General Staff. The Navy's stance contributed to this
belief both in the post-World War II and the pre-GNA
unification debates.96 The simultaneous enhancement of the
Chairman's power illustrates the American propensity toward
efficiency, quick decision, and strength. The advent of the
95E. B. Potter, Admiral Arleigh Burke (New York: Random House, 1990),
433.
96There exists considerable mythology surrounding the comparisons between
U. S. Military organiza-ion and the German General Staff. These fears
translated into law in both the 1958 Amendment and the GNA which contain
explicit prohibitions concerning a General Staff concept. See Robert L.
Goldich, *The Evolution of Congressional Attitudes Toward A General Staff in
the 20th Century," Congressional Research Service report, 30 August 1985, as
reprinted in appendix A, chapter 4, of Defense Organization: The Need For
Chance, 244.
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nuclear age, with its emphasis on rapid response and precise
command and control as a cornerstone of a credible
deterrent, meant that expediency was becoming increasingly
important in warfare.
All of these reorganization initiatives attempted to
strengthen both the Secretary of Defense and CJCS, giving
due consideration to Constitutional prerogatives and
military efficiency. These considerations, however,
inherently conflict. In addition to the civil/military
conflict, there are several other conflicts that emerge from
debates about service unification. These are:
centralization vs. decentralization; conflict (inter-service
rivalry) vs. cooperation (backscratching); and service
(warrior orientation) vs. joint (staff orientation). The
services took positions in support of the issue that best
supported their visions and perceived roles in the national
security picture.
In the first eleven years, the NSA underwent two major
revisions (1949 and 1958), was augmented by Executive Plan
6, and purportedly clarified by the Key West Agreement.
Yet, it would be another 28 years before another change
occurred.97 Unfortunately, this wasn't because the problem
of service unity was solved, nor were service rivalry and
parochialism eliminated. Some twenty studies conducted
97For an excellent history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff see Robert J.
Watson, 'The JCS at 40,1 Defense 82, January 19R2, 22.
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between 1958 and the early 1980s demonstrated remarkable
congruency in problem identification. The studies
demonstrated the inability of DOD "to achieve a balance
between centralized control and decentralized operations.
They question the utility of service secretaries and staffs
as presently configured ... They affirm the relative
impotence of the joint side of the structure.198
Despite their number and congruency, the studies
performed between 1958 and the early 1980s resulted in few
changes. There are a number of reasons for this. First,
the recommendations made by most of the studies lacked
Executive level support because it was unclear as to what
changes could or needed to be made.
Secondly, with the exception of a few individuals or the
study spokesman, a consensus force (such as lobbyists or
Congress) pushing for defense reorganization was largely
missing. The absence of Administration support, as well the
lack of consensus, meant that reform issues weren't
politically salient. The post-Vietnam malaise that gripped
the country in the 1970s would seemingly have created ideal
conditions for making defense reforms politically salient.
Other factors, however, replaced the necessity of defense
r-form. The Executive Branch was under fire as Watergate
dominated Congressional concerns, and a weak Carter
98Dr. Archie D. Barrett, Reaooraisina Defense Organization (Washington,
D C: National Defense University, 1983), 86.
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Administration was unable to convert campaign pledges for
reforming defense into action.99
Third, the professional military was reluctant to fix
something that they perceived was not broken. Evolutionary,
versus revolutionary change has always been desirable and in
fact evolutionary measures are often recognized as the only
feasible change mechanism, given the propensity of
organizations to resist change.1°°
Fourth, despite the numerous studies the long hiatus on
defense reforms from 1958 until GNA in 1986, may indicate
something more than an absence of political saliency and
consensus. General David C. Jones, USAF (ret.) former CJCS
stated:
It is commonly accepted that one result of this
imbalance [between service and joint interests] is a
constant bickering among the services. This is not
the case. On the contrary, interactions among the
services usually result in "negotiated treaties"
which minimize controversy by avoiding challenges to
service interests.1°1
As long as the services maintain their relatively secure
niches within DOD, instances of rivalry are minimal, hence
any perceived necessity for changing the status quo does not
99The Defense Organizational Study of 1977-1980 was part of a Carter
Administration pledge to examine and reform the defense establishment. Very
few reforms were initiated as a result of this study, despite numerous
recommendations for change. See Barrett, 5.
100Recognition of this organizational tendency was a factor in the
enactment of GNA. William J. Lynn discusses this in *The Case for JCS
Reform,' International Security, Winter 1985/86. Also see Barrett, 7.
101David C. Jones, General, USAF, (ret), as quoted in Defense
Oraanization: The Need For Chance, 619.
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surface. Furthermore, Secretary McNamara's strong control
of DOD, through enforced use of his Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System (PPBS), signaled to all the services
that perhaps unification had gone too far. There was a
distaste among the services for further strengthening the
OSD. "Accordingly, the officer corps of the three major
United States military services.. .began to share a steadily
increasing degree of common ground in resisting further
measures toward the centralization of authority within the
U.S. defense establishment.'0 2 The creation of a
perceived common enemy within the defense establishment, in
this case the micromanagement of the services by OSD, drove
the services together. Cooperation served as the
manifestation of service culture by masking parochialism and
rivalry.
I. SUMMARY
This chapter has illustrated a consistent pattern of
Navy opposition to defense reforms. The Navy has
historically argued that centralization of DOD counters the
Constitutional principle of civilian control of the
military. The Navy's opposition also stems from a result-
reinforced perception of having lost each time it attempted
to take the lead on unification issues. While dogmatic
arguments may have been sincerely espoused by such reform
1 02Davis, 234.
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opponents as Admiral Burke, they are more reflective of
artifactual values the Navy maintained than the underlying
assumptions that constitute Navy culture. The differences
reflect cultural assumptions that transcend mere
parochialism and bureaucratic preference. The cultural
assumptions underlie the social relationships that affect
bureaucratic interaction. The artifacts of culture, such as
positions on issues of unification, really remain fairly
constant over time. Changes in espoused strategy genuinely
represented packaging techniques for organizational
survival. The packaged changes are not necessarily planned,
but reactionary efforts to ensure organizational survival
which is perceived to be in the best national interest.
Survival of the organization takes on paramount importance
with respect to national security since service members
believe that the two are mutually interdependent.
The influence of the changing national security
environment - the contingency environment - is very
important in forecasting the degree of conflict between
cultural assumptions and assigned roles with which the
service leaders must deal. Fat budgets bode well for
everyone's philosophy and conflict is minimized. Conversely
lean budgets exacerbate service cultural differences. Since
money and interservice rivalry appear to have a proportional
relationship, the services are charged with parochialism.
The fissure is, as I have attempted to illustrate, much
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deeper - even the best of leaders with the most ideal
structural arrangements can experience frustration.
The issue of rivalry has been discussed, but the reverse
situation is also prevalent. Excessive cooperation, in what
has been labeled as backscratching, frequently occurs.
Services find a comfortable niche within the roles and
missions hierarchy and work towards preserving and
respecting the status quo; this can be reinforced by the
perception of a common organizational enemy such as OSD (or
Congress).
Finally, what are the implications of this for national
security? Understanding that service differences have
historical roots because they are based on fundamental
assumptions of organizational survival is of paramount
importance for all national leaders. Services will not
change overnight. Efforts to effect change that fail to
consider underlying attitudes are doomed to failure - most
reform efforts have beaten this tack.
Rivalry is a manifestation of cultural differences. The
ultimate organizational bond is preservation. In time of
war, with a clear external threat, the American services
have demonstrated that organizational survival and national
survival are one. In the absence of real war, threats to
survival frequently relate to lateral shifts in power within
and between the services. The Navy, with its strong sense
of autonomy and tradition of independent operations at sea,
49
has felt the pain of these "surrogate wars" most acutely.
The next chapter examines the historical roots of the latest
effort to effect DOD organizational change - Goldwater-
Nichols.
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IV. HISTORY OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT (GNA)
A. BACKGROUND
Vietnam, the Pueblo incident (1968), Mayaguez (1975),
Desert One - the aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission
(1980), Lebanon (1983)103, and Grenada(1983) tarnished the
American Military image and credibility. Six hundred dollar
toilet seats confirmed public perceptions of ineptitude,
extravagance, and disarray. While the varied causes of
these debacles are arguable, the net effect is a matter of
historical record. Widespread debate over military
structure, leadership effectiveness, and doctrine ensued.
Congress responded by forming the Congressional Military
Reform Caucus (MRC) in the summer of 1981.104 Concerned
that an inept military was wasting the burgeoning defense
budget, the MRC focused primarily on resources. President
Reagan's defense build-up meant "big bucks" for the
military; Congress, in turn, appropriated the funds and
wanted a larger "say" in how the money was to be spent.
103Dr. Archie Barrett says that Beirut was the 'big one because the same
subcommittee that was dealing with GNA conducted the Beirut investigation.
The feeling was that the CINC was responsible, but did the CINC have the
authority? The chain of command was too convoluted. Beirut helped to
crystalize the subcommittee.* interview by autl'Dr, Washington, DC, 25 July
1991. There is a parallel between the Beirut hearings and the post - WW-II
Pearl Harbor hearings as both spurred reforms.
104Michael J. Leahey, "A History of Defense Reform Since 1970," (Naval
Postgraduate School: Masters Thesis, Dec. 1989) 26.
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Internal conflicts among MRC members over priorities,
coupled with a lack of support for reform from DOD and the
Executive Branch, stymied their initial efforts.
B. THE GNA DEBATE
General David C. Jones, CJCS, fired the opening shot in
the defense reorganization legislative battle. On 3
February 1982 during a closed hearing on the FY83 Defense
Authorization Bill, General Jones (who would soon retire)
criticized the defense organization's ability to plan,
prioritize programs, and prepare for war.1"s He followed
this testimony with a series of scathing articles in
national publications. General Jones received support from
General Edward C. Meyer, then current Army Chief of Staff,
who wrote a critical article in the April 1982 edition of
Armed Forces Journal International. General Meyer's
revolutionary recommendations included dissolving the JCS in
favor of a separate advisory board.10 6 The emergence of
internal DOD sponsors for refcerm gaivc-nized Congress and the
public, producing widespread support for change.
These interrelated factors - military failure, the
Congressional Reform Movement, and the internal DOD reform
105Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Reorganization Proposals
For The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Hearinas before the Investiaative
Subcommittee, 98th Cong., Ist sess., 14 June 1983, 1.
2
06Edward C. Meyer, Gen., USA, "The JCS-How Much Reform Is Needed, Armed
Forces Journal International, April 1982, p. 82.
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push - ensured the viability of reform legislation. Spurred
by these factors, Congress moved to conduct hearings on
defense reorganization.
The House Armed Services Investigative Subcommittee
conducted the first round of hearings from 21 April through
5 August 1982. The result was a relatively modest proposal
which called for minor modification of existing practices.
The bill was "intended to overcome the most pressing JCS
organizational problems" by concentrating on the
organization and quality of the JCS.10 7 Following passage
in the House, the bill went to the Senate for consideration.
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), under the
leadership of Senator John Tower (R-TX), reservedly took up
the issue of reform. The opening Senate hearings were
conducted on 16 December 1982. Portions of these initial
Senate hearings turned into an indictment of Navy
intransigence:
The staff [JCS], we found, had some real problems
... In some services, the services were inclined to
try to give their very best people's service to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff's staff, but we found that in
other services, it was regarded by the officer corps
that service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff was sort
of a way station, an inhibition in the progress of
their career. So therefore, people really were not
seeking service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And
10Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services Report 98-382, Joint
Chiefs of Staff Reoraanization Act of 1983, 98th Cong., ist sess., p. 3.
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indeed, we found that often, the services were not
putting their very best people on the staff. °8
While not mentioning the Navy by name, it was understood
that "other services" meant Navy. This would be a theme
repeated in later Congressional hearings, as the Navy was
widely viewed as part of the problem both in terms of
supporting a strong JCS and advocating change to the
existing structure.
During the Senate hearings Admiral James Holloway, USN,
(ret.) emphasized the necessity of strong civilian control
over the military; a theme that had long been advocated by
the Navy.
Our approach to a national military command
structure must be fully consistent with our national
ideals and democratic form of government. What
would work for a totalitarian regime will not be
acceptable to the American people. The twin
foundations of national policy governing the
concepts of a national military command structure
for the United States are: First, that it will
produce the correct military decisions for the
survival of this country; second, that it will
preserve the democratic principles of civilian
control. I will get to my point quickly by saying
that.. .HR 6954 in one single piece of legislation
will violate the safeguards for the assurance of
civilian control and substantially reduce the
opportunity for arriving at the best military
decisions crucial to our national survival."0 9
°'
0Rep. Richard C. White, Chairman, House Investigative Subcommittee
statement as quoted in, Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Structure and Operating Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 97th Cong.,
2nd sess., 16 Dec. 1982, 4.
10 Structure and Ooeratina Procedures for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 35.
HR 6954 was the House proposed legislation. It recommended strengthening the
authority of the CJCS, tied the JS directly to the CJCS, further enhancing
the power of the individual, and designated the CJCS the principal military
advisor to the President.
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In other testimony, by stating that the proposed reforms had
not gone far enough, General Maxwell Taylor, USA (ret.),
former CJCS, permitted the Administration and Republican-
controlled Senate an out - more study:
Indeed it would be damaging to national security if
this bill in its present form became law. If
passed, it would foster a general belief that
Congress after months of study had found and
corrected such weaknesses as may have existed in the
Joint Chiefs system and henceforth... there would be
little chance for true reform for another decade or
SO.
110
Based on the December 1982 hearings, Senator Tower initiated
a study that would take nearly three years. In addition to
Senator Tower's hesitance over reform, there were legitimate
reasons for further study. It was widely viewed among
reform proponents that indeed, the House proposals did not
go far enough.
Another "crucial factor missing" was the
Administration's view.' In a letter to the Chairman of
the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense
Casper Weinberger reviewed the initiatives undertaken by DOD
to address recognized shortfalls in organizational
structure. He stated that needed changes were already in
effect, owing to internal DOD measures. Additionally, he
introduced a modest bill thought by many to simply placate
110Structure and Operatina Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30.
U1Reoraanization Proposals For The Joint Chiefs Of Staff Hearinas Before
The Investicative Subcommittee of The Committee On ArmeJ Services, 14 June
1983 p. 1.
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Congress."2 By this time the outspoken generals Jones and
Meyer were retired and their successors were more supportive
of the Secretary of Defense's view. Secretary Weinberger's
letter acknowledged DOD's acceptance of the need for minor
change, but advocated that this change come from within.
Behind Weinberger's tactful, yet resistant, approach
lurked the staunchest DOD opponent of reform, Secretary of
the Navy John Lehman. In a 1984 Washington Post article,
Secretary Lehman commented on the proposed reforms saying
that "an old, bad idea surfaces again". The Navy Secretary
declared:
... this bad idea subverts two of the most important
principles of American military institutions:
civilian control, wherein authority to decide
whether to conduct military operations is reserved
to civilian authority advised by service chiefs, and
command responsibility, wherein authority to plan
operations once decided, including tactics and
timing, is vested primarily in those who have to
carry them out, the operational and joint
commanders, not the unaccountable military
staffs.. .many of those who are proposing the
change.. .do not realize that such a change would do
violence to the basic concepts on which this nation
is founded."3
While DOD attempted to come to grips with the growing
clamor for reform, Congress tested the legislative waters by
attaching an amendment to the FY85 Defense Authorization
bill. This amendment met little opposition because its
2 Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, ltr to Bill Nichols, Chairman,
Investigative Subcommittee Committee on Armed Services 19 May 1983, reprinted
in H.A.S.C., Hearing 98-8, 14 June 1983.
'"John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, 'Let's Stop Trying to be
Prussians,* Washington Post, 10 June 1984, C(7).
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substance largely reflected the Administration's bill as
proposed by Secretary Weinberger. The provisions made the
Chairman the spokesmdn on operational requirements for the
unified and specified commanders, increased Joint Staff tour
lengths to four years, and made the Chairman responsible for
the selection and assignment of officers to the Joint Staff.
The Secretary of Defense was made responsible for ensuring
that officer promotion, retention, and assignment give
consideration to performance as a member of the Joint
Staff.
Reorganization hearings continued throughout 1983 and
1984. The questioL. was not whether the Department of
Defense would be reorganized, but how much and when? The
House viewed themselves as the leaders on the issue.
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Les Aspin,
stated:
Compared to Bill Nichols, Barry Goldwater comes in a
far second in the reorganizing effort. Bill Nichols
is the person who has been pushing this legislation
consistently, patiently, doggedly, skillfully,
intelligently for all these years ever since he has
become chairman of the Investigative Subcommittee.
He stared down John Tower and got him to accept a
'"The 1984 changes (FY85 Defense Authorization Bill) actually went beyond
structural changes by attempting to ensure a quality Joint Staff. These
provisions, however, gave broad guidance to the CJCS and Secretary of
Defense. Just two years later Congress' belief that the measures wele not
tough enough is reflected by the extensive and detailed measures enacLed in
the GNA to ensure compliance.
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limited amount of reform and John Tower wasn't for
reforming anything. 5
The task force study initiated by Senator Tower received
renewed priority in 1985. Fueled by the Democratic
leadership of Senator Sam Nunn and the final push of
Republican Senator Barry Goldwater, in his last term before
retirement, the study was completed in the fall of 1985.6
A series of Senate floor speeches by Nunn and Goldwater
presented the study findings while sounding a call for
action.117
The momentum leading up to the enactment of GNA reflects
bipartisan Senate leadership and acquiescence from within
the Administration. The radical propc ils endorsed in the
Senate study, such as dissolving the JCS, seemed to move
DOD, and the Navy in particular, toward compromise. As a
result, Secretary Lehman's formal testimony became less
adversarial while then CJCS Admiral Crowe's testimony is
even somewhat supportive of the House initiatives."8  The
nSCongress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Full Committee
Consideration of H.R. 43-0 To Amend Title 10, United States Code To
Reorganize The Department Of Defense, 99th Conn., 2nd Sess., 25 June 1986, p.
86.
16The study report was entitled, The Defense Organization: The Need for
Change. The study director was James R. Locher III currently serving as the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict. The study was considered so crucial that an extra edition of Armed
Forces Journal International was published in October 1985 highlighting the
study findings.
117Congressional Record, 1,2,3,4,7,and 8 October 1985.
1"8Congress, House, Committee on Armed Service--, Reorganization of the
Department of Defense Hearings Before The Investiaations Subcommittee, 99th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 19 February - 12 March 1986, pp. 40-317.
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Administration reflected this new spirit by forming the
Packard Commission.
After the House version of the Defense Reorganization
bill, HR3622, passed on 20 November 1985 by a vote of 383-
27, the stage was set for passage of the major defense
reform legislation. When the Packard Commission issued its
interim report on February 28, 1986, the findings were
remarkably congruent with those of the Legislature. "During
its markup sessions, the Senate Committee on Armed Services
evaluated the Packard Commission's recommendations and found
them to be consistent with provisions"'... of their bill.
On the surface the proposed defense reorganization bill and
Packard Commission Report were similar. Key differences,
however, existed. The Packard Report lacked an in-depth
review of joint officer management. It focused instead on
acquisition reform which was directly opposite the focus of
Congress. Yet, this dichotomy received little notice
outside DOD which continued to resist the joint officer
policies because it viewed them as micromanagement of
officers.
The final thrust for change came in the form of a letter
from President Reagan to Congress endorsing the Packard
Commission's findings and urging Congress to make the right
19Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Denartment of Defense
Pe-raanizato- Actr of 986, Co , titLee Renort (9 9 -2C8), 99th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
p. 6:.
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decisions.""° The Senate passed its version of
reorganization legislation on 7 May 1986 by a vote of 95 -
0. The House in turn considered the Senate version, as well
as four other independent House proposals, arriving at a
compromise, HR 4370, which passed the House 406 - 4. Both
House and Senate versions then went to conference. During
the drafting of the Conference Committee's version of GNA,
DOD refused Congress' request for officers to assist them in
writing the joint officer management portions of the
bill.'21 Agreement within DOD existed on the necessity and
inevitability of most of the reforms, but the officer
management provisions were not appreciated by the services
who felt that the broad guidance given in the FY85
legislation to the Secretary of Defense was sufficient to
ensure adequate officer management and emphasis on Joint
Staff duty. It is not entirely clear why DOD refused the
request to assist in drafting the officer management
policies, since this would have provided an opportunity to
shape the issue in its genesis. Perhaps DOD felt that this
would send a message to Congress or that the provisions
would really only reiterate existing wide policy guidance.
In any event, th-e resulting provisions were a far cry from
1
20Ronald Reagan, President, message to Congress outlining proposals for
improvement to the defense establishment, 24 April 1986, reprinted in 'A
Quest for Excellence," Final Report of the Packard Commission, pp. 43-50.
121Dennis Clausen, LCOL, USA, and others, Joint Specialty Officers:
Improving the Military During a Period of Refori. (Harvard University,
National Security Discussion Paper, Series 88-03), 9.
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the broad guidance originally enacted in the FY85 Defense
Authorization Bill. The joint officer management program
was the most revolutionary element that survived
Congressional debate and compromise, and DOD continued to
resist these provisions throughout the debate. Officer
management provided a direct challenge to each of the
individual service cultures. Based on the Navy's historical
disdain for staff duty, one might expect this to counter
Naval culture. When those provisions threatened individual
service autonomy and how each managed its own people, then a
culturally evoked response of resistance emerged from each
of the services.
On 12 September 1986 the Conference Committee reported
out the Goldwater - Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, which the President signed into
law on 1 October 1986.
C. GNA PROVISIONS - UNDERLYING INFLUENCES
Two of the prime movers behind the (HASC) and (SASC)
bill drafting and reconciliation in conference committee
were Dr. Archie Barrett and James R. Locher III. Dr.
Barrett focused on an appreciation for the "politically
possible" 122 reforms. The reason reform proposals had
largely been disdained, he argues, is not because of the
inability to identify common problems. In fact, the
122Barrett, 7.
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numerous studies conducted since 1970 demonstrated the
validity of the identified DOD organizational deficiencies
by independently arriving at similar conclusions over a
significant time span. The problem was that proposed
solutions usually were either too radical, thereby receiving
immediate rejection by the bureaucracy, or too easily molded
into existing directives and instructions, thus never
receiving adequate emphasis or followup.12' Dr. Barrett's
modest recommendations form the backbone of many of the
subsequent GNA provisions. He emphasized that the skewed
balance of power between the services and Joint Staff (JS)
was in part because, "the services control its [the JS]
personnel structure and have no interest in developing a JS
whose talent rivals service staffs." 124 In this regard the
most fundamental way that the GNA would enhance national
security is by:
Attempting to balance the organizational structure
of DOD. The joint and service institutions were out
of balance. The Act sought to achieve balance and
to strengthen the joint institutions. 25
Yet, despite the recognition of this need for shifting the
balance of service interests, in what he refers to as the






meaning the "employing arm," his proposals primarily
consisted of modest structural modifications such as:
Establish a joint military institution within the
present employing arm, at its core consisting of the
Chairman of the JCS and the CINCs, with an
organizational interest in advancing joint military
positions. Strengthen the Chairman and CINCs.
Increase the independence of the Joint Staff. Leave
the JCS essentially unchanged.2 1
While the net effect of Dr. Barrett's recommendations
emphasized the necessity for institutionalizing the joint
culture, his proposals for accomplishing this contained only
structural modifications.
The impetus for GNA major personnel changes arose from
the study headed by Secretary Locher. The bipartisan study
report entitled The Defense Organization: The Need For
Change continues to be heralded as a landmark contribution
to the understanding and analysis of DOD organizational, as
well as Congressional deficiencies, with respect to national
security. The study aggregates 92 recommendations into ten
problem areas. 27  However, few of the study's more
controversial recommendations, such as disbanding the JCS in
favor of a separate advisory council, made it into the
126Barrett, 264.
127Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 614-632. The ten problem
themes are: 1. imbalance of emphasis on functions versus missions, 2.
imbalance of service versus joint interests, 3.inter-service logrolling
(backscratching), 4.predominance of programming and budgeting, 5. lack of
clarity of strategic goals, 6. insufficient mechanisms for change,
7.inadequate quality of political appointees and joint duty military
personnel, 8. failure to clarify the desired division of work, 9. excessive
spans of control and absence of effective hierarchical structures, and 10.
insufficient power and influence of the Secretary of Defense.
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Senate version of the defense reform bill because of their
radical nature.
A significant difference between Dr. Barrett's study and
the Senate study was the discussion of personnel quality.
Both agreed that a major shortcoming behind the JCS'
inability to provide quality advice and effect strategic
direction over the services was due to the poor quality of
its staff. The Senate study went much further:
...organizational realignments, by themselves, will
not be sufficient. They will need to be augmented
by major changes in the education and training of
military officers of all Services. The objective of
these changes should be to produce military officers
with a greater commitment to national (instead of
Service) security requirements, a genuine multi-
Service perspective, and an improved understanding
of the other Services. 28
From this analysis the study recommended establishing "in
each Service a joint duty career specialty. "1 9 This
became the basis for the Joint Officer Personnel
requirements of Title IV to the GNA.
It is within these requirements that Congress intended
for the long-term shaping of attitudes and molding of the
officer corps. More recently Secretary Locher stated his
belief that "the most overriding intention of the GNA was to
shift the balance of orientation within the military from
service-dominated toward a balanced service/joint
128Defense Oroanization: The Need For Change, 618.
129Defense Organization: The Need for Chanae, 11.
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institution. """° Furthermore, he asserts that the joint
officer management provisions were designed to:
Change the organizational lines by tying in
promotions.. .numerous military officers were
interviewed for the study, most did not covet joint
duty despite being supportive of GNA actions.
Congress decided that this was one of the most
important aspects of the proposed legislation.
Resistance was furious, but the modifications have
measurably improved the quality of the joint
staff."'
The task of writing into law the concept of joint officer
management fell to Dr. Barrett who states that "the kernels
of the officer management program were sparked by a 1982
study conducted for the Chairman known as the Brimm report
and the 1985 CSIS (Center for Strategic and International
Studies) report."1' " Dr. Barrett states:
Writing this concept into law was one of the hardest
things I have had to do. Initially we were not
going to do anything with personnel, a lot of people
kept telling us that organizational shifts don't
matter without good officers to support.. .we started
to think that maybe this was more than lip service
designed to keep us from changing the
organization."'
130James R. Locher III, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, interview by author, Washington DC, 24
July 1991.
13Locher, interview.
132Barrett, interview. Also see, Toward a More Effective Defense: The
Final Renort of the CSIS Defense Oraanization Project, (Georgetown University
Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Feb.
1985), *Giving the Chairman greater authority over the Joint Staff would only
improve cross-service military advice if the military personnel system were
also modified so that officers were attracted to, trained for, and rewarded
for service in joint positions. Toward this end, we recommend that each
service establish a 'Joint Specialty.'' 14.
133Barrett, interview.
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From these origins, the personnel provisions of the GNA were
enacted into law. This signified the end of decades of only
changing DOD structure as a way of achieving a balanced
service/joint DOD organization.
D. SUMMARY
There were major similarities between the reform
movement of the 1980's and previous successful efforts.
These similarities were a perceived inefficient use of
resources, the tocsin from within the defense establishment,
and the opposition of the Navy. This time the call for
reform was sounded by the uniformed chiefs rather than the
President or Secretary of Defense, but it still had the same
effect of making the issue politically safe. Both the FY85
Defense Authorization Bill and GNA were precipitated by
Executive compromise proposals. In 1983 it was an
Executive-sponsored bill, while in 1986 it was the Reagan
endorsement of the Packard Commission. Congress could
support defense and credit itself with enacting change, both
political pluses, without alienating DOD or the Executive
Branch.
The Navy again aligned itself against unification using
many of the same arguments that were forwarded in 1947,
1949, and 1958. But it was not just the Navy that disdained
the joint officer personnel provisions of the GNA. All of
the services considered these provisions micromanagement.
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While the centralization provisions of the GNA countered
Navy proclivities for decentralized operations, the joint
officer management provisions challenged the organizational
strength and autonomy of all the services.
There were significant similarities between earlier
reforms and the roots of GNA. There were, however, also new
patterns. First, failures diminished public esteem for the
military, making them easier targets for reform. No longer
were the services viewed predominantly as bastions of
integrity and competence. 13 The public and Congress were
skeptical of military performance. The formation of the MRC
before reform became a politically safe issue reflects this.
Second, the new Congress mirrored evolving attitudes in
the post-Vietnam United States. Unlike previous successful
reforms, Congress was taking the initiative by aggressively
pursuing hearings and bill proposals. The work of highly
principled members, such as Bill Nichols, was instrumental
in this effort.13S
Third, for the first time members of the internal DOD
structure, notably Generals Jones and Meyer, spoke out in
favor of reform while still on active duty.
134For examples of public and military opinion data see: 'The Top Brass,





Finally, the fundamental difference between the GNA
reforms and any previous efforts are the personnel policies.
Congress went beyond structural changes, seeking to
influence and alter the beliefs of individuals. By tying
promotions to joint duty, Congress sought to enhance
national security by ensuring that the best officers were
enticed into joint jobs. By strengthening the bond between
the individual officer's need for job security and career
enhancement and joint duty, Congress has created the
mechanism for a cultural shift in the military.
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V. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT (GNA) PROVISIONS, CHANGES, AND
PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the provisions, changes, and
interpretation problems of GNA. More far reaching than
simple structural changes to DOD organization, key
provisions covering the promotions, assignments and
education of officers are the backbone of GNA. These
provisions, largely contained within Title IV of the GNA,
are the principal mechanisms behind the shift in power
within DOD. As Dr. Archie Barrett stated, "anyone who
doesn't understand what Title IV was designed to achieve
hasn't studied GNA."'.36 In addition to these key
provisions, numerous changes to GNA have been enacted in the
annual Defense Authorization bills since 1986. These
changes are part of the GNA reform process and reflect both
Congressional intent and DOD desires. Considering the
revolutionary aspects of the joint officer management
programs of Title IV, the complexity of all the GNA
provisions, and the number of changes that have been enacted
since 1986, problems have arisen interpreting the intention





The preamble of the GNA states:
In enacting this ACT, it is the intent of
Congress...
1. to reorganize the Department of Defense and
strengthen civilian authority in the Department;
2. to improve the military advice provided to the
President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense;
3. to place clear responsibility on the commanders
of the unified and specified combatant commands for
the accomplishments of missions assigned to those
commands;
4. to ensure that the authority of the commanders of
the unified and specified combatant commands is
fully commensurate with the responsibility of those
commanders for the accomplishment of missions
assigned to their commands;
5. to increase attention to the formulation of
strategy and to contingency planning;
6. to provide for more efficient use of defense
resources;
7. to improve joint officer management policies; and
8. otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of
military operations and improve the management and
administration of the Department of Defense. 1'
These eight broad areas cover the objectives Congress sought
in enacting specific provisions of the Act. The fundamental
purpose of GNA was to improve national security.
Congressman Ike Skelton states:
The primary purpose of the GNA was to cause things
to work better... to change things in the chain of
command, the power structure, the joint specialty,
and the special education requirements, thereby
causing things to work better and more smoothly. 3 '
137Goldwater-Nichols Department Of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
(GNA), Public Law 99-433, 1 Oct. 1986, sec. 3.
1
3
8Ike Skelton, Congressman, Chairman of The Panel on Military Education,
interview by author, Washington, DC, 24 July 1991.
70
This was accomplished through a number of provisions, the
most significant of which were designed to:
- increase the authority and responsibility of the
CJCS and CINCs, including improved staff quality,
power over their staffs and subordinates, and inputs
into the budget process. To streamline and reduce
the staffs of the service secretaries and service
chiefs while lifting the size restrictions on tre
CJCS staff.
- establish a new joint military occupational
specialty for the management of officers who are
trained and orientated in joint matters. Specifies
educational qualifications, tour lengths, and
promotion requirements for a new cadre of officers
termed joint specialty officers (JSOs).
A Congressional Research Service (CRS) Issues Brief offers
this analysis of the provisions in GNA:
Implicit in these changes is the acceptance of the
notion that DOD's organizational structure prior to
enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act did indeed
suffer from excessive service independence and
inadequate central planning, direction, and
leadership, and rejection of the opposite critique
that the organizational status quo had been
satisfactory or even excessively centralized.' 39
Structurally, the Chairman was designated "the principal
military advisor to the President."'4° The criticism that
this would isolate the President from necscsa ry and
divergent viewpoints was answered with a provision that any
service chief "may submit to the Chairman advice or an
opinion in disagreement with, or advice or opinion in
139Robert L. Goldich, "Department of Defense Organization: Current
Legislative Issues, (Congiessional Research Service Issues Brief, The
Library of Congress, Washington, DC: 17 Dec. 1987) 6.
14 GNA, sec. 151(b) .
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addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the
President, National Security Council, or the Secretary of
Defense.. .Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of
such member at the same time he presents his own."'4
The law removed the corporate JCS from the chain of
command. The streamlined chain of command runs from the
President to the Secretary of Defense, to the unified
commanders. A common myth is that GNA removed the service
chiefs from the operational chain of command. In fact, this
was accomplished by the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act.142
GNA simply clarified the intent of Congress by ensuring that
the JCS is not unnecessarily supplanted within the chain of
command.
The influence of the Chairman and CINCs was also
enhanced through provisions allowing them greater "say" in
budget matters. While the budgetary provisions have shifted
the balunce of power toward the joint institutions, the
services continue to have the preponderance of power in this
area. The General Accounting Office (GAO) noted that
141GNA, sec. 151(d).
142Defense Oraanization: The Need for Change, 147. The Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 specified that the "chain of command runs
from the President to the Secretary of Defense and through the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified commands... this function
has often been misinterpreted to mean that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
actually in the chain of command for military operations.' Congress sought
to clarify this in GNA by stating that unless otherwise directed by the
President, the chain of command to a unified or specified combatant command
runs-(l) from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and (2) from the
Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command." GNA, sec.
162 (b). As noted the President does have the authority to modify this and
the current pra-tice has been to include the CS.
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although the unified commands were permitted to develop
separate budget inputs under GNA, they were not doing
so. :4  GAO determined that while this is not a violation
of the law, it clearly undermines the intent of Congress and
lessens the unified commanders' real power over component
commands and the services.
Redrawing the structural lines, by clarifying the chain
of command and designating the CJCS as the principal
military advisor to the President, has increased the power
of the joint side of the military. Budget power has also
improved joint influence in the process, but the real
drivers are the Title !V, Joint Officer Personnel Policies
which require that:
The Secretary of Defense shall establish policies,
procedures, and practices for the effective
management of officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps on the active-duty list who are
particularly trained in, orientated toward joint
matters.. .such officers shall be identified or
designated... in such a manner as the Secretary of
Defense directs.. .officers to be managed by such
policies, procedures, and practices are referred to
as having or having been nominated for, the "joint
specialty.,14E
The Secretary of Defense is required to establish career
guidelines for "I. selection, 2. military education,




3. training, 4. types of duty assignments, and 5. such other
matters as the Secretary of Defense considers
appropriate. ,'146
The selection criteria for joint duty is designed to
ensure top quality officers on the JS and the CINC staffs by
specifically tying in promotion requirements.'47 By
including the "bread and butter" of personal careers,
Congress ensured individual officers would seek joint jobs
and that the overall quality of joint staffs would be high.
This provision, perhaps more than any other, has significant
potential for facilitating the shift in the balance of power
between service and joint institutions. Vice Admiral M.
Boorda, Chief of Naval Personnel, states that clearly "the
promotion system is the driver"'4 8 with respect to
strengthening the joint institutions and making the military
more joint.
In the area of military education the Secretary of
Defense was required to:
1
46GNA, sec. 661 (e). JCS Adjmin Pub 1.2, Joint Officer Manaaement, 30
June 1989, is the official DOD implementing document for the Title IV GNA
Joint Officer Personnel Policies. A new directive is being written that will
consolidate this guidance, expected completion is December 1991.
'
4 GNA, sec. 662 (a) (1), promotions of officers who have served or are
serving on the joint staff are expected to be promoted at a ra-e not less
than comparable contemporaries on service headquarter staffs .... :e rule for
officers with the joint specialty.. .other joint duty assignments - ,r officers
other than the above shall be promoted at a rate not less than the rate for
comparable contemporaries service wide.
148M. Boorda, Vice Admiral, Chief of Naval Personnel, interview by author,
Washington, DC: 23 July 1991.
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... with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall periodically review
and revise the curriculum of each school of the
National Defense University (and any other joint
professional military education school) to enhance
the education and training of officers in joint
matters. The Secretary shall require such schools to
maintain rigorous standards for the military
education of officers with the joint
specialty .... Secretary of Defense shall require that
each Department of Defense school...periodically
review and revise its curriculum for senior and
intermediate grade officers in order to strengthen
the focus on-(l) joint matters and (2) preparing
officers for joint duty assignments.49
GNA sought to emphasize education as a means of improving
the officer corps and strengthening the joint institution.
Professional military education was envisioned as a
mechanism to influence the culture of the officer corps and
thereby provide the long-term mechanism for stimulating
organizational change. To accomplish this Congress
initially established broad guidelines giving the Secretary
of Defense considerable leeway in the mechanics.
The provisions of GNA which sought to streamline and
reduce the staffs of the services, while easing size
restrictions on the JS, have provided a simple yet flexible
source of power for the CJCS. Dr. Archie Barrett recognized
this possibility:
Reducing.. .operations-orientated parts of the
service staffs could supply the personnel needed to
man a dedicated staff for the Chairman, increase
Joint Staff operations, planning, and command and
control capabilities, and provide the unified
commands with the wherewithal to assume new




This area has received even more emphasis post-GNA, as the
ceiling on JS size was lifted in 1990. 51"
C. CHANGES
Size restrictions on the JS are just one of several
provisions of the Act that have been modified since 1986.
The current law has been amended four times in the FY87, 88,
89, and 90 Defense Authorization Acts.5 2 The extensive
changes to the law since 1986, designed in part to provide
flexibility to DOD and ensure continued compliance, have
skewed the focus away from the big picture towards an
emphasis on details. The changes illustrate Congress'
commitment towards making GNA work. The changes also
reflect DOD's desire to see some of the management
restrictions eased.
DOD has attempted to have some of the more specific and
rigid joint officer management provisions eased. DOD
desired more flexibility by seeking less restrictive joint
ISOBarrett, 269.
151The pre-GNA limit on JS size was set at 400, GNA changed it to 1627,
now there is no limit on size (changed in PL 101-510 stat. 902 5 Nov 1990).
152Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management and Personnel), Report on the Study of Joint Officer
Manaaement Initiatives, draft copy, April 1990, 3. and CRS Issues Brief, 17
Decemner 1987, 1. In sunnary the 1987 FY Defense Authorization Act created
the Special Operations Command, the 1988 and 1989 FY Defense Authorization
Act were largely initiated by DOD and contained some easing of time and
sequencing requirements for joint officer management, and the 1990 FY Defense
Authorization Act included revised guidelines for professional military
education.
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tour lengths, joint military education and tour sequencing
requirements, and less restrictive tour requirements for
critical occupation specialist (COS) officers.EA "The
amendments to the joint officer personnel provisions of GNA
agreed to in the FY88 National Defense Authorization Act
(sections 1301-1305) were much more limited and
restricted.. .due to the adamant wishes of the House to give
the original provisions more time to work before changing
them. ,,I1 4
While DOD generally leans toward less restrictive
measures, the House wants to stay the course. The
compromises reached in the FY88 Defense Authorization Act
have produced some confusion as well as given DOD a small
margin of greater flexibility. For example, while tour
length requirements were shortened and sequencing
requirements for COS officers were eased, the amendments
placed stringent restrictions on the flexible use of COS
officers. One such restriction limited "the number of 2-
year COS joint duty assignments that may be excluded from
the annual computation of the average length of joint duty
151COS officers are the warfighters in each service, for the Navy these
are the aviators, surface officers, SEALS, and submariners. There is
considerable language and discussion with regard to this category of officer.
Clearly the intent of GNA was to ensure that the JS contained a substantial
proportion of these officers and that their tour lengths were long enough to
provide continuity and benefit froim their warfare eyperience. A previous
criticism was that "hot runners' would serve a minimal amount of time in a
j:-nt to, ;r so a-- t gc tnr vo.t tizkert" punzhed.
1S4CRS Issues Brief, 17 Dec. 198 -7, 10.
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assignments to not more than 10 percent of the number of all
joint duty assignment positions identified.'5
Most of the Title IV requirements can be waived by
either the Secretary of Defense or the President. Congress,
however, clearly intended for the waiver provisions to be
the exception rather than the rule. This is underscored by
the requirement to report numerous categories of waivers,
including a person-by-person accounting."6  Clearly this
is detail-orientated administration. Dr. Archie Barrett
echoes this observation by saying that, "many provision of
the GNA are rightly described as micromanagement." 5 7
Another amendment to GNA contained in the FY88 Defense
Authorization Act reflects Congressional desires to
emphasize the importance of joint duty at the highest levels
of the military. The amendment stipulates that a
155congress, House, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1988 and 1989, Conference Report to accompany HR 1748, 100th Cong., Ist
sess., 17 November 1987, 695. In addition to the 10% rule the amendments
also imposed several other numerical wickets notably the 25% and 12.5% rules.
The point is that while the law was amended to provide some flexibility
additional numerical requirements were imposed by Congress to quantify just
how much flexibility would be permitted. In some cases these requirements
have actually made the officer management more confusing. One joint
personnel action officer wailed, 'do they mean 10% by paygrade/year, 10% for
all paygrades, or just approximately 10%/year." Interview by author, July
1991.
156 Panel on Military Education Report, 4. Also see Congress, House,
Committee on Armed Services, Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces (as
amended through April 6, 1991), Committee Print, April 1991, 191-194,
requires 18 categories of reports from the Secretary of Defense to Congress
with respect to joint officer management.
1'5 Barrett, interview.
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substantial (agreed that substantial means 50%)'" portion
of joint duty assignments (JDA) for general and flag
officers shall be designated as critical. S9 This
requirement, in combination with the other provisions that
cover flag officers, has enhanced the status of joint jobs.
The other provisions include: for flag promotions to LGEN
and VADM, the CJCS shall submit to the Secretary of Defense
the Chairman's evaluation of that officer's performance as a
member of the JS and in other joint duty assignments; the
requirement that the CINCs must be joint specialists and
that in order to be the CJCS or the VCJCS, one must have
served as a CINC; and the requirement that all new flag
officers must have served in a joint duty assignment prior
to selection for flag. One LCOL on the JS cited the
provisions of GNA that tie joint duty with promotion and
advancement to flag as "the keystone behind making GNA
effective." ' ,
There have been growing pains associated with these
provisions, and as with most officer management
requirements, the Navy has felt these pains most acutely
ISSUnited States General Accounting Office, Defense Personnel: Status of
Imtiementina Joint Assionments for Military Leaders, (Washington, DC: January
1991), 1, NSIAD-91-50BR.
159A critical joint duty assignment is a joint duty position designated
as requiring someone specially trained and educated in joint matters-a joint
specialty officer (JSO).
160Interview with JS 0-5, November 1991. DOD instruction 1320.5, which
required that a flag officer serve in a joint duty tour prior to selection to
flag, was in existence prior to GNA, but adherence was not widespread.
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with the Navy relying on "good-of-service" waivers and
special waiver authority for nuclear-trained officers.'61
These provisions ensure that the general/flag officer
leadership in the military will have experience shaped by
joint duty, thus theoretically translating into a greater
appreciation of the joint perspective among the senior
officer corps. The first group of amendments to GNA
accommodated some of the DOD desire for flexibility while
still ensuring rigid Congressional oversight.
The second area of major change to GNA has been in the
area of the educational aspects of joint officer personnel
policy. Changes here arose from a Congressional belief that
DOD's performance was not meeting the intent or the letter
of the law, particularly those areas where Congress had
established broad guidelines for DOD. Dr. Barrett comments:
It became apparent that DOD was hooking onto other
provisions of GNA which undermined the intent. They
were simply waving a magic wand in order to credit
all existing service schools with giving joint
education. 162
In 1987 responding to perceived deficiencies in the
education on joint matters, the House formed the Panel on
Military Education (also referred to as the Skelton Panel).
161The "good-of-service" waivers are difficult to obtain while the special
nuclear waivers expire in 1994. "The Navy received good-of-service waivers
for six of 41 officers promoted to rear admiral in 1990, six of 41 promoted
in 1991 and five of 40 picked for 1992. Nuclear waivers went to five
officers in the same three-year period.* John Burlage, 'Joint Duty the Navy




The Panel's mission included assuring that professional
military education provides the proper linkage between the
service-competent officer and joint officer. Congress feels
that influencing service culture is best achieved through
education and officer management. The Panel on Military
Education Report stated that "joint education is a major way
to change the professional military culture so that officers
accept and support the strengthened joint elements.'"63
A letter sent to the Education Panel Chairman, Ike
Skelton set forth the charter of the education panel:
The Panel on Military Education should review
Department of Defense plans for implementing the
joint professional military education requirements
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act with a view toward
assuring that this education provides the proper
linkage between the service competent officer and
the competent joint officer. The panel should also
assess the ability of the current Department of
Defense military education system to develop
professional military strategists, joint warfighters
and tacticians.164
The Panel conducted a voluminous series of hearings in 1987
and 1988, consisting of former top military leaders,
government officials, Secretaries of Defense, leading
strategists, and academics.
26
3Panel on Military Education Renort, 12.
164Les Aspin, Congressman, Chairman House Armed Services Committee, letter
to Ike Skelton, Congre.ssman, reprinted in Professional Military Education:
Hearinas before the Panel on Mil:tarv Educati- n, 100th Cong., Ist and 2nd
sess., 13 Nov. 1987, 3.
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The Panel concluded "that the DOD military education
system is sound.'' Despite this overall assessment the
system was found to be lacking in several areas. There was
an overall lack of rigorous and quality education, nor was
there a standardized system to ensure a DOD-wide framework
for joint and strategic education. In general the Panel
felt that the intention of the GNA was not being met:
The service schools fall far short of any reasonable
standards for the joint education they are required
by law to provide in their curricula for all
students. The narrow service-orientated focus
appears to be the product of several factors:
limited student and faculty representation from the
other services; the resulting shortage of expertise;
lack of a body of joint doctrine and other materials
to support joint education; and, possibly, the
inclination of the leadership of the service
schools."'
The Panel's analysis led them to conclude that the military
education system should return to the preeminent position it
occupied in the 1930s:
The panel's conclusion after its review of the
evolution of PME since World War II, however, is
that a return to historical roots is indicated. The
Goldwater-Nichols Act, with its emphasis on the
imperatives of joint warfare and the consequent
strengthening of joint institutions, demands a
reappraisal of the direction in which professional
military education has evolved. What World War II
1
65Panel on Military Education Report, 2.
166Panel On Military Education Report, 80. Service schools refer to the
particular service orientated professional military education schools, namely
the College of Naval Command and Staff and College of Naval Warfare, Newport,
RI; The Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA; The Army Command and General
Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS; The Air Command and Staff College and Air
War College, Maxwell AFB, AL; and Marine Corps Command and Staff College,
Quantico, VA. The joint schools are the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk,
VA; and National Defense University and Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, Washington, DC.
82
military leaders learned from the war about how to
structure military education is more consistent with
the demands of the Goldwater-Nichols Act than the
PME system today.
The recommendations of the Skelton panel with regard to
joint education were enacted into law by the FY 1990 Defense
Authorization Act. The changes created a two-phased
educational process for joint education, established several
reporting requirements with respect to joint education, and
clarified the intent of Congress in areas of joint education
including a specific prohibition in calling a service school
a joint education facility. 8
D. PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
Has the Department, however, through its
implementation efforts met not only the letter of
the law but also its underlying spirit or
intent? 6'
Because of the sparseness of the legislative
language, the panel next found it necessary to
develop a more detailed portrait of the joint
specialist.17'
Neither the legislation nor the legislative history
further explains the intended meaning of the
phrase(joint matters) ... Secretary of Defense has
167Panel on Military Education Reoort, 50. See, also The Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Joint Education System '943-1986, March 1988, for a detailed
account of the evolution and content of the joint education system.
168Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Title 10, United States
Code Armed Forces (as amended through April 6, 1991), Committee Print, April1991, 185-195.
169Report on the Study of Joint Officer Management Initiatives, 23.
170Panel on Military Education Renort, 43.
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interpreted the phrase as including both operational
and nonoperational joint positions.'71
Given so much precise language, detailed statutes, extensive
oversight, and voluminous analysis in publications and
studies, why do questions of interpretation or problems of
implementation still arise?
First, "the devils are in the details" of the language
and the laws. The requirements are detailed and explicit
and although instituted to ensure compliance, they have
translated into cumbersome reality. VADM M. Boorda, Chief
of Naval Personnel comments:
I think we should have a military that produces
greater amounts of readiness. One way for
accomplishing this is to do it in a joint way,
without destroying service identification. The
issues standing in our way evolve around not
flailing ourselves to death over little bureaucratic
things...to understand we're evolving.. .to not be
too tied to procedures that get more important than
the end result. For example, we have a rule that
says a joint billet can be filled by a JSO nominee
who is also a COS, but that it cannot be more than
12.5% of the JDAL. Now isn't it awful that the
Chief of Naval Personnel knows that and worries
about it.. .why 12.5% and not 10 or 42%? That's what
I'm talking about when I say we don't want this to
become a system for clerks, we want a system that
makes sense, that produces the most jointness and
military combat power.172
The emphasis on meeting numerical requirem~ents skews the
focus and draws efforts away from the real priority of GNA
271United States General Accounting Office, Military Personnel:





which is to improve national security by redistributing the
power balance between joint and service interests.
Second, the term "jointness" has become a buzzword for
everything. There is no official DOD definition of
"jointness." The closest definition is in GNA which
defines "joint matters" as:
The term joint matters means relating to the
integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces
including matters relating to (1) national military
strategy; (2) strategic planning and contingency
planning; and (3) command and control of combat
operations under unified command.173
In conjunction with that definition, GNA specifies that a
joint duty assignment (JDA) is an assignment:
... in which the officer gains significant experience
in joint matters and shall exclude-(A) assignments
for joint training and education and; (B)
assignments within an officer's own military
department.74
It was envisioned by the drafters of GNA that DOD would
generate programs and flesh out the details of what a joint
duty assignment would be and what qualifications the
officers filling those billets would have. The conferees
recognized that "only a limited base of information and only
a few existing policies were available.. .unanticipated
problems will be identified as the Defense Department
implements the provisions of Title IV.. .adjustments will be
17 3CNA, sec., 668 (a).
174GNA, sec., 668 (b)
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necessary. ""' The original joint officer policies were
"intended to give the Secretary of Defense sufficient
latitude in establishing the 'joint specialty', including
designating it with another term. The conferees believed
that the.. .amendment provides tre necessary latitude and
unambiguously states the intent of Congress tI-t an
effective system for the management of joint specialty
officers be established. -7 ,, With this understanding the
Education Panel Chairman, Representative :ke Skelton, was
disappointed. "What are the characteristics oL the JSO?
That question has not been answered, the panel was
disappointed to learn, fully two years aftei passage of
GNA ,, 77
DOD made some attempt to clarify the meaning of
jointness and come to understand the concept. Th- Senior
Military Schools Review Board (SMSRB), or Dougherty Boa-d,
expanded the definition of joint matters to include
"national security policy.. .joint and combined operations,
joint doctrine...and actions related to mobilization of
forces/resources, joint logistics, communications, and
175Congress, House, Go dwater-Nichols Deoartment of Defense F-eorgnnization
Act of 1986, Conference Report, 9th Cong., 2nd sess., 12 Septemnber 1986,
134.
176 oldwater-Nichols Deoartmenti of Defense Reorganization Act of 198b,
Conference ReporL, i2 September 196, 13n.
mPanel on Mihitarv Education Rerort, 52.
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intelligence, and the joint aspects of the planning,
programming, and budgeting process."'78
Using the Dougherty Board report as a basis, the Skelton
Report defined joint matters "to include: (1)the elements
contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act... (2)several other
subjects subsumed in the Goldwater-Nichols definition such
as: joint and combined operations, joint doctrine, joint
logistics, joint communication, joint intelligence,
theater/campaign planning, and joint military command and
control systems and their interface with national command
systems, and (3)force development including certain military
aspects of mobilization. 179
The Skelton Panel next specified what it felt the
characteristics of the joint specialist should be:
In the view of the panel, the joint specialist most
consistent with the law is an officer, expert in his
own warfare specialty and service, who develops a
deep understanding, broad knowledge, and keen
appreciation of the integrated employment and
support of all service capabilities in the pursuit
of national objectives.. .should be in the top
quarter of their year group.18
JCS Admin Pub 1.2 Joint Officer Management, which implements
and explains the Title IV provisions provides a definition
of a JSO that is consistent with the Skelton Panel report,
but the definition of joint matters included in the JCS Pub
1'Panel on Military Education Report, 59.
1'"Panel on Military Education Report, 60-61.
1'Panel on Military Education Report, 56.
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1.2 is not, in that it repeats the GNA criteria excluding
the additional support emphasis. The expansion of the
characteristics of a JSO and the dichotomy between
definitions of "joint matters" contributes to problems
discerning intention. The Panel on Military Education
Report is inconsistent in that it calls for the redirection
of the joint duty assignment list (JDAL)181 toward an
operational focus while also extending the original
definition of "joint matters" to include support elements.
The dichotomy of views about what jointness, read "joint
matters", means stems from the changing interpretations of
its definition. The GNA provides a broad, warfighting
interpretation of "joint matters" while subsequent reports,
that do not have the statutory teeth of the law, have
expanded the definition to include support elements. Two
problems arise from this. First, a clear understanding of
what constitutes "joint matters" and its associated jobs and
officers are extremely important because these concepts set
boundaries for the emerging joint culture. There is a
lead/lag effect associated with these concepts; little
opportunity existed for adjusting to the original GNA
direction before it was changed. Secondly, while the
""The joint duty assignment list (JDAL) is a GNA-mandated list which
designates the authorized joint duty assignments. A joint duty assignment is
*an assignment to a designated position in a multi-Service or multinational
command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support
of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three services." JCS
Admin Pub 1.2
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guidance forwarded in the Skelton Report was intended to
clarify and delineate the JDA and JSO concepts, it also
expanded them. Now the implementors in DOD, who in many
cases were just beginning to understand what the original
law intended, are left with a new intention based only on a
report. Furthermore, the intention contained in the Skelton
Report contained some unrealistic specifications such as, a
JSO should be in the top 25% of his year group. 182
Apparently Congress felt that the guidance forwarded in the
Skelton Report and translated into DOD policy by JCS Admin
Pub 1.2 was adequate since it did not enact it into law.
Unfortunately the expansion of the definition of "joint
matters" in these sources has been relatively obscure when
compared to the language of the original GNA. A number of
persons interviewed for this study pointed out the
discrepancy between the law and other sources. The changing
definitions of what constitutes "jointness" compounds the
interpretation of Congressional mandates.
It is this study's conclusion that adequate written
guidance exists for discerning the intent of the "joint
matters" and "joint duty assignment" provisions of the GNA,
but that the guidance is difficult to find and follow
because it is not contained in the original law, nor
adequately explained in any other source. The present
182Panel on Military Education Report, 56. Year groups are ranked
according to lineal numbers.
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interpretation of what constitutes "joint matters" has also
expanded to include too much support emphasis; a point which
will be further discussed in Chapters VI and VII. The
problems of interpretation contribute to a communication
breakdown between the implementors, in the trenches of DOD,
and the enactors in Congress. A lack of a consensus as to
what constitutes "jointness" has compounded the already
difficult task of shifting power between service cultures
and the joint culture. Without a clearly defined notion of
what the joint culture should be, shaping the military
around it is meaningless.
Finally, the third source of interpretation problems
relates to the entire Title IV program of GNA and the way it
was enacted. As stated previously, DOD balked at
Congressional requests for assistance in writing the Title
IV portions of the law. The understanding and subsequent
communications problem began here. Then in areas where DOD
was given latitude, it either fell short of Congressional
expectations or responded with a flurry of waivers and
watered down provisions.'83 Problems of communication
continue today. Numerous documents had to be reviewed to
understand what Congress intended "joint matters" to
encompass. Apparently Congress perceived this problem, as
183Barrett, interview.
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it felt compelled to reiterate its intent when considering
DOD-proposed changes to GNA.
The conferees agreed that their action should not be
considered as changing the original purposes of the
altered provisions which include:
(A) making joint education relevant to joint duty by
establishing a pattern whereby education normally
precedes a joint duty assignment for officers
attempting to qualify for selection to the joint
specialty;
(B) lengthening joint duty tours in order to
increase the experience level of officers in joint
duty assignments and, thereby, the quality of their
contribution;
(C) requiring that key joint duty assignments be
filled only by officers who have met the educational
and experience requirements and have been selected
for the joint specialty;
(D) safeguarding the future promotions and
assignments of joint officers;
(E) making joint duty a prerequisite for promotion
to general or flag rank. 84
From the trenches of DOD (Navy side) the laments of one
action officer are juxtaposed with the complaints from
within the HASC. CDR Doug Roulstone, joint personnel action
officer, states, "where is the trail that discusses the JSO
concept? What does Congress intend by some of the specific
legislative requirements?,18 5 While Dr. Archie Barrett
complains:
The supporting organizations (individual services)
are always seeking the advantage. These individual
services are hardy, invigorating institutions with a
lot of power. The joint staff should be protecting
the power given them under GNA, but they seem to
pass along service views. I'm seen as pessimistic
284Congress, House, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1988 and 1989, Conference report to accompany HR 1748, 17 November 1987, 694.
ISSRoulstone, interview.
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and hardline. Every proposal we see is to weaken
GNA. A primary reason it is working on the other
hand is because of Congress' oversight. This
oversight has been intense. In addition to our
hearings, the GAO has conducted numerous
investigations, with several currently ongoing and
more in the works. We're continuously amazed that
five years after the law was passed, many issues are
still not resolved. 186
Somewhere in between there must be a middle ground of
communication and understanding. In shifting power toward
balanced service/joint cultures, it is essential to
understand what the system is shifting toward. In that
regard the continuous changes and problems of interpretation
have prevented the creation of a clear concept of the joint
culture. As VADM Boorda stated, "we must understand that we
are evolving and to not be too caught up in the little
bureaucratic things. "187
E. SUMMARY
This chapter covered the GNA provisions, changes, and
problems of interpretations. Three points are noteworthy.
First, the provisions of the law were consistent with the
ideas of the principal architects in that considerably more
than structural changes were sought. The mechanisms
necessary for creating cultural change, particularly






Secondly, the changes to the GNA have reflected DOD
desires for more flexibility versus Congress' adamant
intention to stay the course. Congress believes that tough,
numerically binding requirements are the only way to force a
still-recalcitrant DOj to comply with the more difficult
portions of the joint officer management initiatives. This
is evident in the detailed person-by-person accounting and
reporting that Congress has required of DOD. This does not,
however, foster the openness and communication necessary to
make such a monumental undertaking and revolutionary law
work more efficiently.
Third, interpretation problems flow from these first two
points. Lots of new requirements, nearly annual revisions
of GNA for the past five years, and communications barriers
have created problems discerning intent. These problems are
both real and perceived. Their existence detracts from
implementing the law and improving national security.
Tying promotion and career progression to joint duty
heightened individual awareness by relating personal job
security needs to joint duty. Behavior, attitudes, and
beliefs concerning the desirability of joint positions were
potentially altered. By structuring joint duty assignments,
creating a JSO category, and tying flag promotions to joint
duty, the creators of GNA sought to force the services to
accommodate its provisions and ideals. Educational changes
are the long-term glue designed to preserve the ideals of
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jointness thereby internali7ing a "joint perspective" into
the officer and service belief system.
Have the provisions of the GNA, the key mechanisms of
promotion, assignments, and education in particular,
resulted in shifting the balance of power within DOD? Is
DOD more balanced between joint and service institutions
today than five years ago? Chapter VI assesses the
effectiveness of the GNA by considering the perceptions of
key leaders and military personnel and examining the output
variables of operations, plans, and people-related programs.
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VI. ASSESSMENT OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT (GNA)
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter assesses the effectiveness of the GNA and
its application by asking several questions. For example,
what constitutes "effective?" How does one know whether the
Act is working or not? How do you measure jointness?
Congress has recognized this problem and installed a number
of measures by which to gauge DOD's performance. Measuring
jointness, however, involves more than numbers. Jointness
is an attitude that says "together we can do it better" and
"I'm committed to making it happen in the best way,
regardless of cost to my service." This chapter will
examine some of the Congressional measures for jointness; in
addition, it will try to determine how the country's
leadership and members of the military perceive the
effectiveness of GNA. Measuring perception is critical,
since the attitude of those involved will determine future
directions and changes. Behavioral change (evidence of
internalization by the service cultures) is inextricably
linked to values and beliefs. Once the organizations have
seriously committed jointness to their belief system, this
will be reflected in the artifacts of culture -
organizational behavior. The subconscious internalization
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of jointness will then be manifested through joint actions,
writings, and thinking. Three dimensions of the U.S.
military - operations, plans, and people - are examined by
considering whether the GNA has instilled a greater joint
perspective in the U.S. military and particularly, the Navy.
B. PERCEPTIONS
Jointness has improved.. .but there is still not
enough of it. Egos get in the way, as well as
service parochialism. We can overcome this by
continuing to concentrate on leadership, schools,
and joint operations."'
Joint awareness is unquestionably high within the U.S.
military. Professional journals, newspapers, and
newsletters are laden with the benefits of doing things
jointly. The concept of "jointness" receives only minor
criticism compared with overall support. In the lexicon and
writings of the military, jointness has become motherhood.
As one Congressional staff member put it, "this is what
President Harry Truman envisioned in 1947." '189 Yet beneath
this overall positive evaluation, pockets of resistance,
uncertainty, and caution remain. The Navy, which stubbornly
resisted GNA, is now seen by those outside the Navy
organization, as supportive of jointness. On the other
18BRep. John R. Kasich, HASC, Washington DC, interview by author, 24 July
1991.
189Thomas Peter Glakas, special assistant for defense affairs to Rep. Ike
Skelton, interview by author, 24 July 1991.
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hand, Navy beliefs, on whether GNA is effective and if the
Navy is onboard, are less convincing.'
There is a certair degree of inevitability behind the
law. One Navy captain stated:
Whether neople agree or disagree (with Goldwater-
Nichols) doesn't matter. The law is very clear.
It's almost impossible to do any operation that
isn't joint anymore.-
This sentiment was virtually unanimous among those
interviewed and in the literature. General Colin Powell,
CJCS, explains:
It [the law] isn't going to be changed; it isn't
going to be reversed; and the sooner everyone
acknowledges that Goldwater-Nichols is here to stay
in this brave new joint world, the better off we
will all be."0-
The editors of the Marine Corps Gazette acknowledge that:
...jointness is a theme of the times.. .any
conceivable military action of size will certainly
require the capabilities of most if not all of the
Services, and today's military leaders at all levels
should understand this, prepare for it, and adjust
their thinking accordingly. Jointness is
reality.l
Yet, despite the overall opinion that the GNA and its
emphasis on jointness is good for national security, the
'
9Based on author's review of Navy writings, Navy official statements,
and interviews (conducted in the summer of 1991). The author conducted
approximately thirty interviews with OPNAV, OSD, and Joint Staff military
personnel of all ranks and services.
191John Burlage, "Joint Duty the Navy Way: Tour, School or Waiver, It's
a Ticket Officers Want Punched," !La-i Times, 20 May 1991, 13.
'
92Colin Powell, General, USA, CJCS, ltr to the editor, Marine Corps
Gazette, vol. 75, no. 10, October 1991, 15.
19
3Editors, Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 75, no. 10, October 1991, 2.
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military, and the Navy, some pockets of resistance and
individual notes of caution still exist.
The 1980s were notable in that there was little of
the interservice disagreement that marked the first
two decades after World War II and Korea. All is
sweetness and light and happy jointness; few realize
that this sweetness and light basically is the
result of expanding-or at least adequate-budgets.
There has been little about which to disagree. 194
People who go to the joint staff have to learn their
role. They represent me. I have to look out for
the "white shirt" interests.19S
The Navy is arrogant in victory, surly in defeat,
and difficult to deal with at all stages in between.
The Navy is coming to grips with the inevitable.
There are some people with some vision. But to some
in the "old school", integration still means
subordination.""
To the typical Navy officer jointness is a block
that needs checked to get flag... the Navy is falling
further behind the power curve as it continues to
put Navy interests ahead of national interests.197
These quotes serve to illustrate the underlying caution and
confusion regarding the effectiveness of the GNA. Much of
the caution and negativeness about how the Navy is living up
to the letter and spirit of the law reflects a curious Navy
self-perception regarding past opposition to defense
reforms.
194J. C. Wylie, RADM, USN, (ret.), "Heads Up, Navy,' United States Naval
Institute Proceedinas, May 1991, 17.
195Interview with Navy 0-6 in OPNAV, May 1991. Reflects interviewee's
viewpoint on proper Navy-joint relation.
196Interview with Navy 0-6 June 1991.
197 Interview with OPNAV 0-3, former JCS intern, July 1991.
98
The self-doubt is an interesting aspect of the Navy's
image of itself on jointness and may reflect inner beliefs
which still cling to the ideals of naval autonomy. The
self-doubt also reflects organizational perspective. For
example, most Naval officers interviewed, when asked to
characterize the Navy's attitude with respect to jointness
and how the other services view us, responded in a similar
rranner. The following quote represents a typical Navy self-
perception, "the other services view us as isolationists and
it is not an inaccurate view. It will take a generation to
wipe out.'198
Those outside the Navy don't necessarily view the Navy
in this light."' Dr. Archie Barrett states:
The Navy sees itself as having the most
institutional interest in getting onboard with
jointness. They have a very supportive Chief of
Naval Personnel in VADM Boorda. The Navy had the
farthest to come and perhaps it has come the
farthest.200
An Army colonel on the joint staff sees the Navy as
"onboard" with regard to jointness; an Air Force colonel
19SInterview Navy 0-6, July 1991.
19'The author noted that those in OPNAV, particularly of junior ranks (0-4
and 0-3), tended to be more open , while those outside the Navy, members of
Congress, other services, and Navy officers serving on joint staffs seemed to
give more politically correct answers. Two point arise from this. First,
how much will anyone really tell an 0-3 working on a research project,
although some interviews were very candid and open? And secondly, this
introduces a certain bias error on the perceptual findings. As one 0-5
stated, 'You'll be hard pressed to find anyone in this building (Pentagon)
who will speak publicly against jointness."
200Barrett, interview.
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says that "the Navy is very supportive of GNA";20 1 and
Rep. Ike Skelton states:
We have come alcng way. In Desert Storm I give all
five services a lot of credit. The Navy did a
remarkably fine job.2"2
The Navy has gone from opposing jointness in the mid - 1980s
to accepting it today; others see us as part of the team as
well. But, we in the Navy often ee ourselves in another
light. Perhaps this reflects deep-seated assumptions about
ourselves. Clearly it will take more than five years to
alter basic assumptions so deeply steeped in the Navy's
historical and sociological roots. Culture changes slowly.
The internalization of new beliefs and the self-perception
of being onboard with jointness will lag changes to the law.
C. OPERATIONS
The extent to which operations in the Gulf and
within various staff echelons demonstrated the
degree of jointness sought by GNA will likely remain
an active topic in the media, in Congress, and in
Departmental and professional circles.. .the
Department is committed to continuing actively to
foster jointness.2 °3
Has the GNA affected the way the U.S. military, and the Navy
in particular, conducts operations? Are operations today
201Interviews by author, October 1991.
202Skelton, interview.
2 03Secretary of Defense, Interim Report to Congress: Conduct of the
Persian Gulf Conflict, July 1991, 262. This report contains a specific
question asking DOD to assess the effect on the conduct of U.S. military
operations resulting from implementation of the GNA."
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less plagued by the types of communication and
organizational bungling that characterized Beirut, Grenada,
and Desert One? The Gulf War provided a real-time test of
GNA effectiveness. One analysis of the GNA concluded that
"we are left, in fact, with a sobering thought: the true
test of military reform will come not in peace but in
war."20 4 A recent article in the National Interest
concluded that "the Goldwater-Nichols reform will be judged
largely through the prism of U.S. victory in the Persian
Gulf."205 The article asserted that, "the first - and
ultimate - test of reform is whether what was legislated has
helped national leaders to plan, prepare, and execute
military operations better in crisis and war. The Gulf War
provided the first real test of the quality of military
advice and operations under the system that Goldwater-
Nichols established. ,206
A number of top military and political leaders believe
that GNA was instrumental in the U.S.-led coalition's
smashing victory. Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman HASC,
states:
No longer was it necessary to assign tasks among the
services for parochial reasons, an operational
commander could make the best uses of his resources
204Mark Perry, Four Stars, as quoted in Report on the Study of Joint
Officer Management Initiatives, 44.
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regardless of service. It [GNA] created one clear
line of command, one integrated operational plan,
and one focal point for decisions on the ground.20 7
Rep. Nicholas Mavroules, Chairman HASC Investigative
Subcommittee, states that "when General Schwarzkopf came to
the Hill, he said that GNA was a 'wonderful piece of
legislation. ' ,208 General Schwarzkopf characterized
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm as the "classic example
of a multi-service operation, a truly joint operation.,29
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney states:
GNA was clearly a success, as demonstrated in the
Gulf War. It enabled the CJCS to give specific non-
parochial advice to the President and myself and it
allowed the CINCs to do their jobs.210
To what, do these Congressional and military leaders argue,
do we owe the success? Specifically, what provisions within
GNA resulted in improvements in joint operations such that
the "inept" military of the 1970s and early 1980s would be
transformed into an effective warfighting machine? To this
the common answer is that GNA empowered the commander, in
this case General Schwarzkopf, to do his job. Rep. Kasich
states that, "GNA empowered those on the ground to conduct
20
'Aspin's Major Factors of Desert Victory,* Sea Power, August 1991, 39.
208Rep. Nicholas Mavroules, Chairman HASC Investigating Subcommittee,
interview by author, Washington, DC, 24 July 1991.
2 
"Norman Schwarzkopf, General, USA, speech at Naval Academy Graduation,
Annapolis, MD, 29 May 1991.
210Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, remarks at the Naval Postgraduate
School, 4 April 1991.
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the campaign by allowing them to concentrate on the
important aspects of operations. '21 1
Yet many argue otherwise. ADM David Jeremiah, VCJCS,
comments that "most people would argue that given the same
cast of characters, the operation would probably have played
out very much the same even if Goldwater-Nichols reforms had
not been in place. ''21 2 Former Secretary of Defense Harold
Brown remarks, "one should not draw too many conclusions
from the Gulf War because in many ways it is not
reproducible."2' There is no doubt that GNA provided the
framework for a streamlined chain of command and improved
operational planning. One wonders, however, how convoluted
Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf, with their prior Vietnam
experience, would have permitted the chain of command to
become, regardless of legislated requirements. Despite the
euphoria of the War and the connection made by Congress and
top military leadership positions between GNA and the War's
success, significant problems in joint operations existed.
VADM James D. Williams, Deputy CNO for Naval Warfare,
points out one of the Navy's biggest problems during the
war:
We need more command and control for the USN in the
next two years than in the last fifteen years
2nKasich, interview.
212Larry Grossman, "Beyond Rivalry,, Government Executive, June 1991, 10.
213Grossman, 15.
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combined. Communications was our biggest problem
during Desert Storm. We spent half our time fighting
to communicate.214
A Defense News article analyzed the Navy's problems:
...among the problems outlined... sharply limited
communications channels, poor coordination with
allies and with the U.S. Air Force, inadequate
distribution of ciphers.. .and slow dissemination of
intelligence pictures.. .These problems can be traced
back to the Navy's longstanding lack of interest in
multi-service and allied cooperation...215
RADM James D. Cossey, Assistant Deputy CNO (Plans, Policy,
and Operations) (OP-06B) commenting on the Navy's
communication deficiencies in the Gulf War states, "we can't
get joint if we can't even talk to the other services.,216
Were these new problems that raised their ugly heads only
during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, or were they previously
identified deficiencies that should have been fixed and
avoided? There is evidence that some of these issues
"raised their heads three years ago" during the Solid Shield
1989 exercise. The Navy demonstrated that it could apply
the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFAC) concept at
sea by using borrowed Air Force equipment. Without the Air
Force equipment there was limited ability to communicate and
214 Fighting to Communicate-the USN's Biggest Problem," Jane's Defense
Weekly, 13 April 1991, 586.
215Robert Holzer and Neil Munro, "Navy C3 Woes Continue in Aftermath of
Gulf War," Defense News, 5 August 1991, 4.
2 1RADM James D. Cossey, Assistant Deputy CNO (operations, plans, and
policy) (OP-06B), interview by author, Washington, DC, 26 July 1991.
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integrate Navy assets into the JFAC concept.2 7 There was
a nearly unanimous opinion that communications problems were
the most critical issue in Desert Storm. Is this shades of
Grenada or the debacle of Desert One?
Why, given the legal mandate for jointness, the evident
acceptance of this, and the tremendous emphasis on joint
education as a facilitator, did the first wartime test in
the Gulf War test prove so mixed? There appear to be three
possibilities.
First, true mission integration and joint coordination
does not routinely occur in the military outside the JS and
the CINC staffs.218 In the 1950s President Eisenhower said
that "separate warfare was gone forever", yet we see
statements today saying that it is "just" now going away?
What's going on here? For example, there is some evidence
that concepts of warfare have changed as a result of Desert
Storm. Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for Navy Program Planning (OP-08), offered the
revealing comment that during the Cold War, naval operations
were characterized by "autonomous" operations while now,
post-Cold War, these operations are characterized by the
227Interview with OPNAV 0-6, June 1991. An internal Navy memo from
October 1988 also recognized incompatibilities with the Air Force JFAC
doctrine and existing Navy air control doctrine.
21Dennis Palzkill, LT, USN, "Making Interoperability Work,' United
States Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1991, 50.
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necessity for "joint" interaction.9 9 If it took Desert
Storm to demonstrate to the Navy that the "low ground fog of
jointness" sprung on the services as a result of GNA was not
going away, then truly there are problems of jointness at
levels below the top echelon of the chain of command.
Why wouldn't these perceptions have changed years ago?
Perhaps the analogy to a sporting event can offer a partial
explanation. We can change the rules, the coaches, the
playbook, and the philosophy, but if we don't adequately
practice and test the new system, will we really know if it
works? Or will we really know the system? In the absence
of effective integration at all levels of the military,
problems of jointness remain. As Rep. Kasich states, "we
play like we practice.. .we're doing better at integrated
joint operations, but we still have a ways to go." 220
Second, while the chain of command may have been
streamlined and the officer corps convinced that jointness
was the wave of the future, much of the military's hardware
carries a uni-service flavor. Navy ships' systems were not
compatible with Air Force systems for transmitting the Air
Tasking Order (ATO) - a vital link in air operations. The
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was created to
219Henry H. Mauz, VADM, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Navy Program
Planning (OP-08), and former COMUSNAVCENT (COMSEVENTHFLT during Desert
Shield), remarks and briefing slide from Superintendent's Guest Lecture at
the Naval Postgraduate School, 27 August 991.
220Kasich, interview.
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oversee and eliminate these types of interoperability
problems;221 the truth, however, is that the services
conti.nue to control the preponderance of resources.
Third, just as it may be shortsighted to credit the
success of the Gulf War on GNA, it is equally wrong to blame
military shortcomings on deficiencies in the legislation.
It has only been five years since passage of the Act and a
far lesser time since much of the follow-up legislation was
enacted. Time will reveal additional strengths and
weaknesses with GNA and more fundamentally, with the
joint/service balance of power.
The most revealing lesson of the War is that "jointness"
still needs work. Navy and Air Force planes still fly their
separate missions. Much has been accomplished, but
significantly more effort remains.
Since the War considerable initiative has gone into
fixing some of these problems, particularly the Joint Force
Air Coordinator (JFAC) concept. The Air Force and the Navy
signed a mutual pact to "provide operaticnal commanders
flexible and interoperable forces, supported by appropriate
joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures.. .the
memorandum of agreement on Joint U.S. Navy-U.S. Air Force
221This research did not investigate programming areas and therefore is
not assessing the JROC. To be fair, the problems that surfaced in the Gulf
War were spawned long before the formation of the JROC. The point is that
despite all the internal measures and external laws enacted in the
programming and acquisition areas over the past five years, the services
continue to wield the preponderance of power in this area.
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Effort for Enhanced Interoperability and Cooperation...
calls for the creation of a joint service board to
address.. .issues that have been singled out for initial
consideration. 222
While indicative of an appreciation for the lessons
learned from the War and demonstrative of motivation to make
things work better in the post-War joint military
environment, the fixes are like patches. Missing is a focus
on the underlying systemic deficiencies that spawned the
problems. For example, what inhibited the Navy from fixing
deficiencies with JFAC before the first wartime test? Why
hasn't the tremendous emphasis placed on jointness by the
GNA resulted in better ways for leaders to assess the
readiness of the military to fight? When the author posed
the question to interviewees, as to what some of the missing
dimensions in the present jointness focus might be, for
example training, exercise, or assessment capabilities, the
answers ranged from: "I don't know.".. ."That's too much for
GNA." to "Maybe we should look into that."22 3
222Robert Holzer and Barbra Opall, "AF, Navy Sign Mutual Pact," Defense
News, 16 September 1991, 4 and 42. The Pact identified six areas for initial
examination, expansion of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFAC),
common fuels, Air Force tanker support policies, joint munitions programs,
consolidation of automated mission planning systems, and common night vision
goggles for tactical air.
223Interviews by author July 1991, the author noted that the people he
interviewed were in general focused on the particular issues they confronted
on a daily basis, therefore, there was a hesitancy to delve into other
related but unfamiliar areas. Since exercises are in general the purview of
the CINCs, whom the author did not interview, there probably is some
continuity in the system. At the policy level, however, there seemed to be
a fragmented view of how to best achieve jointness.
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The Skelton Panel Report on military education placed
some emphasis on the concept of readiness. It was stated
that while the Panel did not have time to review the
dimensions of readiness, including training and doctrine,
these areas constituted a fundamental part of the joint
equation. It would be impossible to fully develop joint
specialists and a joint perspective in the military if these
areas were lacking. The Panel concluded that "if such
inadequacies exist, the problem is of the highest moment.
Lives could be lost needlessly in future military operations
if separate service units are not properly integrated into
combat forces.,224 In order for the Experience + Education
+ Talent equation to be effective in developing a truly
joint perspective in the military, this dimension must be
explored. 225
D. PLANNING
The second area in which to assess the effectiveness of
GNA is planning. Planning here refers to producible plans
in the form of doctrine and strategy and human planning in
the form of service staff/JS interaction.
An early indicator that the GNA has been only partially
successful in instilling a joint planning perspective in the
Navy occurred at the 1990 Cooke Conference held at Monterey,
224Panel on Military Education Report, 62.
225See Chapter VII recommendations.
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CA. The conferees included Navy-Marine Fleet CINC planners
and strategists, CNO and HQ USMC staff representatives, the
Naval War College Strategic Studies Group, a Joint Staff
representative and academics. During the briefing of the
CNO's proposed Navy Department long range planning system, a
question was asked, "...with all due respect, where are the
joint inputs?" The tone of the response was, "we have to
get it right first, why do we need joint inputs at this
level?" '226 While there may have been some "tongue in
cheek" in this exchange, the proposed planning cycle did not
include joint inputs.
The area of joint doctrine was identified as a
fundamental weakness by pre-GNA studies. Despite the noted
deficiencies, legal mandate for change, and importance of
this area, the Navy effort to improve joint doctrine has
lagged behind the other services.227 The Navy has an
internal doctrine problem that must be solved in addition to
the joint effort. One Navy captain said that "Navy doctrine
supposedly bubbles up from the fleet. The result of this
magic is that Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs) are woefully
outdated."22 8 In response, the fleets operate on tactical
2261991 Cooke Fleet CINC Planners and Strategists Conference, Naval
Postgraduate School, 7-9 March 1991.
227 Interview with Navy 0-6, June 1991. A 13 October 1988 internal Navy
memo addressed the JFAC and joint doctrine issues. This memo resulted in the
formation of the Navy joint doctrine shop 0P607.
228Interview with Navy 0-6, June 1991.
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memos, often with West/East coast differences. One Navy
commander comments that, "my guess is that knowledge exists
in the fleet, but it stays at sea, and you end up with
Atlantic doctrine and Pacific doctrine, but no collective
doctrine. u229
Has the emphasis on jointness produced a more coherent
vision of the future as articulated in national and military
strategy? The services continue to produce individualized
justifications for roles and missions, based on programmatic
needs. There is no question that service-specific
strategies are necessities - but these must supplement a
well-articulated national strategy. GNA mandated that the
President produce an annual national strategy, which has
been completed including a section on national military
strategy. 230 Additionally, the President, Secretary
Cheney, and General Powell have articulated aspects of this
strategy in speeches and press conferences,231 but there is
little articulation of this strategy beyond that level.
Unlike service strategies which receive advocacy in other
mediums, such as the Navy's recent article on "The Way
229Interview by author.
230National Security Strateay of the United States, The White House,
August 1991.
232 The President's Aspen speech of 2 August 1991 was the first public
articulation of the new military strategy. See Commander James J. Tritten,
USN, (ret.), 'What If It's Peace?' United States Naval Institute Proceedinqs,
October 1991, 36-41.
ii1
Ahead" in United States Naval Institute ProceedinQs,232
there has been little public articulation, explanation, and
fleshing out of the national strategy. This is especially
troublesome considering the complexity of the new concepts
espoused, particularly "reconstitution" and the "base
force".
While the tocsin for change has been sounded at the
national level, the services have continued to produce
strategies largely justifying existing programs, force
structure, and methods of warfare. The Navy's "The Way
Ahead" implies a certain sense of old momentum with its
projection of existing programs into future scenarios.
Another example, is an Air Force White Paper entitled
"Global Reach - Global Power" which pays scant attention to
integrated operations; instead it forwards bureaucratic
arguments for air power vice how air power integrates into
the national security framework.233
The criticism expressed in the Senate staff study that
"the vagueness of the strategic goals of DOD as a whole has
led to their displacement by the subgoals and sub-ideologies
of the Services"234 is still applicable. To be fair,
2
3
2H. Lawrence Garrett III, Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Frank B. Kelso,
CNO, and General A. M. Gray, Commandant of the Marine corps, 'The Way Ahead,"
United States Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1991, 36-47.
233Department of the Air Force, 'The Air Force and U.S. National Security:
Global Reach-Global Power,* White Paper, June 1990.
234Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 623.
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however, the radical world-wide changes in the threat
environment have made the development of strategy more
difficult. 23S The point is that service culture still
dominates strategic thinking. Service culture is an
important element in overall strategy formation and service
expertise must remain strong and viable, but it must do so
within the framework of the national and overall military
strategies. With the forthcoming publication of Joint Pub
1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, the U.S. forces may
finally have the hierarchial framework for a true overall
paradigm of how to fight as a team:
The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight
as a team... Service skills form the very core of our
combat capability. Joint warfare does not lessen
Service traditions, cohesion, or expertise.
Successful joint operations are impossible without
the capabilities developed and embodied in each
Service; Service "cultures," heroes, and
professional standards are indispensable.236
The doctrine and strategy area of planning is very dynamic;
considerable evidence exists that the system is moving
toward better coordinated and cogent plans.
Human aspects of the planning process have changed
considerably as result of GNA. The CJCS has utilized his
235 The Joint Staff is currently undertaking a massive joint doctrine
strategy revision including the development of an overall DOD joint
wa-f!ghting guide, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, that is
intei-nded to provide a joint paradigm for other joint and service doctrines
and strategies. Interview with CDR Walsh, OP-607, Navy Joint Doctrine
Branch, May 1991.
236 Joint Pub 1. Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, draft copy, Nov.
1991, preface.
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significantly enhanced powers and staff strength to
implement streamlined methods of decision making. The old
"safe" but cumbersome staffing procedures that involved a
repetitive system of concurrence and review have been
streamlined.237  Under the new system, interservice
decisions that can be agreed upon at lower levels don't
necessarily have to go to the "Tank" for higher level
approval.238
Has all this resulted in improved decisions and, is this
improved advice available to the CJCS and the President?
Some argue that it has provided a possible mechanism whereby
future leaders might be shut off from vital "conflicting"
views. This concern has been at the core of the historical
civil/military debates in the United States. The Navy
culture has traditionally favored methods which permitted
greater civilian access to divergent views. A recent
article in the National Interest states:
An important question remains, however, as to
whether the President and his senior civilian
237Buffs, Greens, and Red Stripes were part of the lingo of joint and
service action officers. For an explanation of the old iterative process see
Defense Organization: The Need for Change, 156.
238The number of decision 'Tank, sessions has decreased since GNA. LCOL
Powers, JS, phone interview with author, 10 October 1991. There are
basically two levels of "Tank* sessions and two types. The first level is the
OPSDEP, three star level; at this level service operations deputies meet to
review issues for decision at their level or referral to the service chiefs,
which is the second level. At both levels there are information sessions and
decision sessions. The Joint Staff Director, currently an Air Force three
star general, is the CJCS' right-hand man in deciding what issues go into the
'Tank' for decision; clearly this rotational position is a major power
broker.
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advisors hear enough military advice that runs
counter to the chairman's council.. .there is still
concern that the current structure creates the
preconditions for some future chairman to dominate
and shut out his uniformed colleagues.239
There is some perception that the services have less ability
to influence the process. A recent article in the Marine
Corps Gazette states:
It is not clear, however, that Congress intended to
abolish the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a condition that
one could argue is in real danger of happening... It
is clear from press accounts and direct observations
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wasn't present when
the important dialogues were occurring and neither
the President, SECDEF, nor the Chairman bothered to
include them even by reference. It was a narrow
"we" and not infrequently an "I" that described the
foundation of thought behind decisions.24°
The Navy has favored decision making processes which permit
a full voicing of its autonomous viewpoints. Under the old,
repetitive system, a strong Navy staff could easily
interject ideas into the weaker Joint Staff. This was
possible for two reasons. First, the quality and quantity
of Naval officers on the JS was low. 241 OPNAV could
leverage this into an advantage because it clearly
maintained the edge in expertise concerning naval matters.
Secondly, the process ensured issues had to be repetitively
239Campbell, 58.
240Gordon D. Batcheller, Col. USMC, (ret.), *The Eclipse of the Joint
Chiefs,' Marine corps Gazette, July 1991, 32.
241See, for example the quotation in Chapter IV.
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cut through service staffs. Both these factors have
changed. RADM James Cossey comments:
GNA has quantitatively improved the quality of
officers in the JS. Assignment to the JS is now
desired and emphasized. GNA forced the Navy to
start sending better people to the JS... however,
from the service point of view, the balance of power
between the Joint Staff and the services is not
fully satisfactory. While the quality of Navy
officers on the JS has made a difference in terms of
closer working relations and connections, we are
playing in fewer issues and our point of view is no
better understood.242
RADM Cossey believes, however, that overall the changes have
been very positive, particularly those which improved the
Navy quality on the Joint Staff. Furthermore, he states,
"there are enough checks and balances in the system to
prevent any abuses of power."243
Although there is some perception that the services have
less input into the joint decision making process, this view
seems to be a minority opinion among those interviewed in
this study. Also Admiral Kelso, CNO, put the role of the
services (in Desert Shield/Desert Storm) in perspective:
Our role was to provide the trained manpower, the
beans and bullets and that sort of thing that are
available within the U.S. arsenal, in my case the
Navy, to the unified commander in the field and see
to it that it gets to him the best we can in a
timely manner. In other words, I don't give rudder
orders to the ships at sea.244
242Cossey, interview.
243Cossey, interview.
244Grossman, June 1991, 15.
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Those who argue that the service chiefs disappeared during
the Gulf War fail to understand their proper role which is
to train, support, equip, and advise. Those inside the
Pentagon say "the chiefs in fact played an integral role in
planning and operations for Desert Shield and Desert
Storm."245 The CJCS felt so strongly about the
effectiveness of the new system that he personally countered
a negative critique of jointness in the Marine Corps
Gazette:
I cannot think of a single occasion when I was
called upon to provide advice to the President that
I did not consult individually, or as a group, with
my JCS colleagues.. .I would submit that the Chiefs
were more deeply involved in the planning and
execution of this crisis than perhaps any other
crisis in the post-Cold War period. The JCS met
together over 50 times during the crisis.246
E. PEOPLE
The third assessment area examines people-related
provisions of GNA, specifically the provisions of Title IV
designed to enhance quality by tying in promotions and to
influence attitudes through education.
The promotion area includes measuring whether the
quality of the joint staff has improved and examining where
this quality is assigned by reviewing the implementation of
the joint duty assignment list (JDAL). GNA mandated an




improvement in quality of the JS. "The reorganization act
creates the expectation that officers assigned to joint duty
will be at least equivalent in quality to the service
average, although some groups (JSOs and the JS) are expected
to be equivalent in quality to the headquarters staff." '247
Whereas the pre-GNA law also stated that the JS would
consist of the most "outstanding officers, vi248 Congress
sought to guarantee outstanding officers would be assigned
by enacting strict promotion guidance and detailed reporting
requirements.
A 1989 GAO report states that "significant progress" has
been made in implementing the joint matters in personnel
policy.24 9 It is important to note that despite this
improvement, the statistics say nothing about improvements
in output - is this more qualified group producing better
plans and advice?
While the overall improvement of the quality of
personnel assigned to joint staffs is noteworthy, there are
some indicators which lag. The Navy lags the other services
247 United States General Accounting Office, Military Personnel:
Implementation Status of Joint Officer Personnel Policies, April 1989, 9,
NSIAD-89-113.
248Before GNA, Title 10 US CODE sec., 143 (a) (2) read 'Selection of
officers.. .to serve on the joint staff shall be made by the Chairman from a
list of officers.. .each officer whose name is submitted shall be.. .the most
outstanding officers of that armed force.' This remained the same in the
GNA; what changed was the tying in of promotions.
249GAO, April 1989, 2.
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in the majority of the GNA-mandated categories.2  Root
incompatibilities still remain between the Navy's
promotional system, its emphasis on operations, and the
national emphasis on staff duty. Despite efforts to
accommodate jointness in promotional requirements, the Navy
still favors operations.2 ' Should it be any different?
Clearly the law and the nation have moved in another
direction. What implication does this have for the Navy?
One adverse implication is that under-representation of the
Navy on key staffs has resulted in an inability to get the
Navy's point of view across. NAVCENT in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia had 100 Navy personnel, while CENTAF (Air Force) had
2900.252
Another aspect of the promotional and quality question
involves where these top-quality officers are being sent.
The designation of joint duty jobs on the JDAL has already
been explained in Chapter IV. By placing such importance on
jointness, joint duty, and the joint specialty, there has
250See Appendix A of this study for a comparison of the GNA-mandated
promotional data for FY89 and FY90. DOD was required to begin reporting
Title IV-mandated requirements in 1988 but failed to publish the information
in time for the annual SECDEF posture statement. Additionally FY91 data was
not yet available for this study.
2SIThe category causing the Navy the most trouble is officers serving on
joint duty (other than JS and JSOs) that must be promoted at a rate equal to
the service average. See "Punching the Joint Ticket,' Navy Times, 20 May
1991, 15. The GAO April 1989 report and the annual Secretary of Defense
Posture Statement data (see Appendix A of this study) also illustrate the
problems the Navy is having in the 0-4/0-5 bracket; this is the primary zone
for warfighters. In this category the Navy lags behind the other services.
2S2 OP-60B briefing slide, brief at Naval Postgraduate school 21 May 1991.
See also Daniel J. Muir, CDR, USN, "A View from the Black Hole," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings, October 1991, 85.
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been a de-facto elevation of joint duty assignments to a
position of primary status. Are these jobs really prime
jobs? Nearly everyone interviewed for this study indicated
that the current JDAL had many problems including excessive
size, loss of focus on warfighting, arbitrary size limits,
and imbalanced service representation.
The excessive size is related to a creeping emphasis on
"support", which undermines the original warfighting focus
of the GNA. While GNA calls for the establishment of a
cadre of officers skilled in the joint arena, the JCS Admin
Pub 1.2 actually carries this a bit further by stating that
a "Joint Specialty Officer or joint specialist is an officer
designated as a Joint Specialty Officer by the Secretary of
Defense, who is educated and experienced in the employment,
deployment, and support of unified and combined forces to
achieve national security objectives. " 23 This has been
further diluted to include a disproportionately higher
percentage of support billets than was originally intended
by Congress.25 4
DOD's concerns as expressed by Christopher Jehn,
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and
253JCS Admin Pub 1.2, xiii.
254GAO found that roughly 60% of positions in sampled operational
organizations (joint staffs) provided experience in joint operational
matters. 42% of the positions in the sampled defense agencies provide
operational experience. GAO, February 1990, 3. Some argue that this is
about the right percentage of support to warfighting emphasis. However, the
system was created to provide joint perspective and experience for future
leaders, such as CINcs and general/flag officers - not support organizations.
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Personnel), are that a smaller JDAL and a more operational
focus would cause problems in the following categories:
1) Enough billets for the general/flag officer requirements.
2) Failure to recognize the true value of support
organizations and their work. 3) Disruption of current
implementation plans. 4) Reduction of the number of billets
and opportunities for combat arms officers.255
While DOD has supported the current JDAL size and
composition, Congress has not. The Panel on Military
Education Report recommended a complete and thorough
validation of the JDAL, recognizing that the total number of
8000-9000 set by DOD, and the number of critical billets
(1000) specified by Congress, were arbitrary numbers.256
The Panel believed that a review of the JDAL would save
money and enhance the status of joint positions. Despite
these calls for review and streamlining, to date, nearly two
and one-half years after that Congressional report, there
has been no review and the JDAL remains large. 257 The focus
255United States Government Accounting Office, Military Personnel:
Designation of Joint Duty Assignments, February 1990, NSIAD-90-66, 34. Also
see Report on the Study of Joint Officer Management Initiatives, 10, 36, and
40.
256Panel on Military Education Report, 17.
2SAn OSD study group is currently reviewing the JDAL, recommendations
should be forthcoming late this year. This review is not a position-by-
position review as recommended by Congress. LCOL W. Showers, J-1, said that
such a review is not feasible, due to the cost and excessive timeframe
required to complete the job. What is needed, LCOL Showers stated, is a
validation of the existing numbers based on a reasonable assessment of the
pool of officers each service needs at the 0-6 level to ensure the requisite
selectivity and numbers for a quality population of flag officers. A
computer model of some type could be produced to do this. Interview author,
November, 27 1991.
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of joint duty assignments has also ballooned to include a
large portion of non-operational jobs, a trend which has
apparently been endorsed by both DOD and Congress.
This is significant for several reasons. First, as the
services downsize, a static JDAL might create unforeseen
problems. Rigid adherence to an arbitrarily derived number,
that paradoxically has such importance, is unsatisfactory.
The size of the JDAL must be based on the needs of the
services and joint staffs. Key billets must be filled from
a large enough pool of officers to ensure selectivity, while
enough key billets must also be available to create a
competitive supply of officers for future flag duty.
Secondly, it shows an unresponsiveness to Congressional
concerns by DOD - lack of initiative on this level is not
conducive to improving the larger spirit of cooperation
necessary for improved understanding and relations.
Thirdly, the perceived lack of significance of certain
joint jobs confirms attitudes that joint duty is just
another ticket punch and takes away from the overarching
importance it has. A revamping of the JDAL and a revision
of the philosophy underlying what constitutes a joint duty
assignment would contribute to fixing these problems. It
also could redirect the focus back to warfighting. VADM M.
Boorda comments that "we can't let this become a system for
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clerks; it must be for warfighters. '258 A battle royal
could emerge over this issue as Defense Agencies and s~rvice
support branches would fight their perceived degraded
status.
Finally, while the intent was that the JDAL and critical
joint positions would be equally distributed among the Navy
and Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force, the numbers tell a
different story. The Navy/Marine Corps has not been
proportionately represented.
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
#JDAL 8235 8363 8623 8907 8952
#critical 1000 1020 1024 1025 1024
#USN-JDAL 1657 1773 1806 1856 1838
#USMC-JDAL 429 444 444 489 502
#USN-crit. 190 205 192* 192* 193*
#USMC-crit. 55 55 59* 62* 64*
* does not include flag positions.259
As the numbers indicate, the Navy/Marine Corps has
consistently maintained about 26 percent of the total joint
duty assignments and about 25 percent of the critical
billets. The remaining billets are about equally split
between the Army and Air Force. Whether this reflects a
continued resistance to joint duty, a failure to leverage
into the JDAL-especially critical jobs, or simply assignment
distribution (read luck of the draw) is a matter of debate.
One joint action officer stated that "he didn't feel that
258Boorda, interview.
2S9Data from LCOL W. Showers, J-l, 1 November 1991. Representation in the
critical flag billet category shows approximately 25% of critical flag
billets filled by Navy/Marines. Like the listed data this figure has been
essentially static since 1988.
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the Navy pushes hard enough for equal representation at the
JS level." This results, he said, "in a difficulty in
getting the Navy opinion heard at higher levels."26"
The final area of people assessment is that of meeting
the educational requirements of GNA. Both the Skelton Panel
report and subsequent GAO reviews have lauded the quality of
education at the Navy professional military education
schools in Newport, RI. The program at the Naval War
College "is closer to graduate-level education than that of
any other PME school." 261  Thomas Glakas, special
assistant for defense affairs to Rep. Ike Skelton, states
"that the Navy has an excellent school at the War
College. ,,262
Despite this overall positive qualitative assessment,
there is one key problem area that has been identified with
respect to the Navy and its professional military
education.263  The Navy does not have a genuine two-tiered
professional military educational program.
260 Interview with Navy 0-5 on OPNAV staff, July 1991.
261Panel on Military Education Report, 160.
262Glakas, interview.
263There are other problem areas which are more indicative of DOD-wide
educational systemic deficiencies, appropriate mix of officers from other
services at the service schools and dilution of phase-one joint education by
permitting phase-one, joint education, non-resident correspudJC.;Ze credit.
The phase-one non-resident correspondence credit does not meet the intent of
Congress. (see Skelton Report, 104) Dr Archie Barrett sees non-resident PME as
a weakening of the intent of Congress. (Barrett, interview)
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One of the primary recommendations of the Panel on
Military Education was for the Navy to develop a tiered
professional military educational (PME) system similar to
both the Army's and Air Force's. Under the PME systems of
the other services, most officers attend both the
intermediate (as an 0-4/0-5) and senior level (0-5/0-6) war
colleges, either in residence or by means of correspondence.
This is considered an "essential" career/promotion
milestone. In marked contrast, if a Naval officer attends
war college it is usually only once, and attendance is
considered desirable but not essential for promotion. RADM
Cossey remarks:
The Navy has always been torn between the desire to
educate and the requirements to operate. However,
education is not always required for operations.
That's why not all flag officers need advanced
degrees and JPME. We have a contrast in assignment
philosophy between the Navy and other services. For
example, the Air Force O-5s almost all have master
degrees, the Air Force has a definite pecking o.der
for service college selection and the Army's the
same way.264
Additionally, because Naval officers do not routinely attend
both the College of Naval Command and Staff and the College
of Naval Warfare, the two courses have a great deal of
similarity.
The Skelton Panel's concerns with the Navy system are
that if the other services are essentially requiring all
their top officers to attend both levels, while the Navy is
264Cossey, interview.
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not, is this good for national security? How can the Navy
effectively integrate its schools into the overall national
system for professional military education, with its
emphasis on tiered learning, if the Navy remains different?
The Panel concludes:
... that the Navy, both in its school assignment
policies and in the Naval War College curricula, has
so slighted intermediate PME that it essentially has
only a senior-level system. The de facto absence of
an intermediate PME level is a matter for both the
Navy and DOD to consider.. .The CNO should consider
whether the Navy's system of short courses could be
taught more effectively and efficiently in a single
school at the lieutenant commander level.26'
The Panel further states that:
Just as major wars in the modern era will be joint,
so too must PME fit into a joint framework. Because
the issue has national security implications for the
development of the military officer corps of all the
services, the Chairman, JCS, and the civilian
leadership of both the Department of the Navy and
Department of Defense should exercise oversight of
the CNO review.266
The Navy responded by making more distinction between its
senior and intermediate schools, but considerable overlap
remains, 26 and Naval officers are still governed by the
old institutional philosophies of attendance at either but
not both, and that education enhances but is not essential
for promotion. A Secretary of Defense Report states that:
265Panel on Military Education Report, 115.
266Panel on Military Education Report, 115.
267United States Government Accounting Office, Navy Status of
Recommendation on Officer's Professional Military Education, March 1991,
NSIAD-91-124BR, 10
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The first priority for the Navy has historically
been for a high degree of professional competence at
sea for four reasons: 1) the sea is inherently
dangerous; 2) war ships are highly complicated with
high technology, advanced machinery, volatile fuels
and munitions, crowded conditions and autonomous
operations; 3) in recent years peacetime naval
operations have been essentially the same as wartime
and the Navy is required to conduct prompt and
sustained combat operations at sea at all times; and
4) operational competence at sea is paramount to the
Navy mission. Although still true, over the past
three years the Navy has undergone a "cultural
change"-joint and staff duty are essential functions
to national security and therefore joint and staff
duty deserve a share of the top talent.268
The numbers of Naval officers attending PME have risen
significantly. Capt. Earl Shaut, joint specialty officer
community manager in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, remarks
"that the Navy has increased the number of officers
attending joint professional military education schools by
33% in the last four years." 269 However, there appears to
be both structural and cultural inhibitors toward further
increases. RADM Joseph C. Strasser, President of the Naval
War College, in testimony before the House Armed Service
Committee on the implementation of the Skelton Panel
recommended that:
The Navy currently has an officer to enlisted ratio
that permits very few naval officers to attend a war
college twice. While I look forward to the day when
the Navy can provide resident PME to every officer
268Secretary of Defense Report to The congressional Committees on Armed
Services, Assessment of Professional Military Education in the Services, and
Discussion of Proposed Leoislation, 8 August 1990, 111-6. Report outlines why
instituting mandatory phased PME for the Navy would not be in the Navy's best
interest.
269
.Punching the Joint Ticket,' Navy Times, 12.
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at least once and preferably twice, I do not
anticipate this happening in the foreseeable future,
particularly as we draw down in size.27°
In response to the numbers problem, Congress authorized the
Navy an additional 200 end-strength numbers in FY91 for the
purpose of PME.271 This helped ease the structural problems
blocking increased Navy participation. Despite the
Secretary of Defense's claim that a cultural change has
occurred, cultural blocks still remain. One House staff
member sees the problem as a numbers problem and an
attitudinal problem in which education does not count as
much as it does in other services.272 Rep. Ike Skelton
comments:
The Navy hasn't gotten onboard yet with requiring
everyone to go to two schools, we'll get you there
someday. We'll bring you into the 20th century.
We're lucky to get you to go to one school now, but
we're there.273
The Navy has attempted to accommodate the Title IV
changes. The accommodation is evident in improved Navy
numbers and educational emphasis, as this chapter has
demonstrated. Considerable effort has gone into educating
the officer corps and detailing them into joint assignments.
However, the Navy's educational philosophy remains unique
270Joseph C. Strasser, RADM, USN, President Naval war College, 'Statement
before the Subcommittee on Professional Military Education, HASC," 17 April
1991, 8.
271Roulstone, interview.
22Interview by author, July 1991.
273Skelton, interview.
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within DOD. While the Navy has aggressively attempted to
accommodate the desires of Congress and the GNA, it has done
so within the framework of its traditional operational
focus. This dimension of Naval culture has not changed.
The assessment in this chapter highlights
incompatibilities between the Navy and the joint system.
The Navy has taken considerable action to get onboard with
the concept of "jointness", and there is undoubtedly
considerable lag-time associated with altering cultural
aspects ingrained by generations of conducting operations a
certain way. Some of the remaining incompatibilities are
structural, but underlying them is the autonomous,
operationally focused culture of the Navy. Given the
uniqueness if the Naval missions, as previously outlined in
Chapter II and as cited in the 8 August 1990 Secretary of
Defense Report, whether it is indeed prudent to make the
Navy "like the Army and Air Force" remains the essence of
the argument. However, where the Navy's traditional way of
doing business, whether it is school or staffing, conflicts
with the remainder of the military, then something must
change. If joint warfare truly is going to be "team
warfare", then service cultures must become more attuned to
the joint culture, including congruent educational,
promotional, and staffing philosophies. The assumption that
no change in outlook can accompany force drawdowns, service
restructuring, or revolutionary changes to the nation's
129
laws, may be steeped in Navy culture, but it is
shortsighted.
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VII. IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT
Service and joint institutions in the United States
military have become more balanced as a result of GNA; in
effect the Navy has become more joint in the way it thinks.
This has not, however, radically changed the Navy's culture.
The United States Navy still emphasizes operations and
favors autonomy.
The Navy has accepted jointness by attempting to
accommodate the concept within its traditional culture. Two
of the biggest influences in this process are independent of
the GNA.
First, the environmental changes brought on by the "new
reality" that there is no longer anyone challenging the Navy
to a "blue water" fight have forced a reevaluation of
traditional roles and missions. Beyond GNA, the contingent
national security environment has changed radically in the
past several years. In the absence of a unifying global
Soviet threat, the missions that shaped the services and the
military for over forty years became less significant. A
sense of organizational purpose is a primary mechanism
shaping organizational culture, thus a true test of GNA's
influence would require a stable international environment.
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Unfortunately this is never very realistic, particularly
now, and we are therefore left with tentative conclusions.
Second, the sociological changes provided by new
leadership have been instrumental in the Navy's moderate
positions on contentious issues such as the new command
structure. The leadership of Admiral Burke strongly
influenced the Navy's opposition to unification in the late
1940s and 1950s. Secretary Lehman continued the fight into
the 1980s. With a generation between the arguments of
Admiral Burke and the present leadership, there is little
historical bondage to the culturally based issues he
espoused. Secretary Lehman's charisma and advocacy for the
Navy were often viewed as double-edged swords. Furthermore,
Secretary Lehman's legacy was not rooted in historical
heroics like Admiral Burke's; consequently, the positions
Secretary Lehman advocated did not endear themselves to the
uniformed Navy.
While changes in the sociological dimension have
facilitated the acceptance of jointness, these same factors
color perceptions about the Navy's positions on jointness.
It will take longer than the five years since GNA was
enacted to erase decades of perceptions that the Navy
obstructs jointness. Unfortunately this means that the Navy
must work harder than any other service to make its voice
heard in the joint arena.
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Outside the inevitability that the Navy must accept
jointness, what is the proof that the Navy wants to be heard
in the joint arena? And where is the proof that the Navy's
culture has accepted jointness through accommodation into
its existing structure, versus internalization into its
belief system?
Key leaders both in Congress and the military believe
that the Navy has changed its orientation; indeed, the
Secretary of Defense reported this to Congress.274
However, as this study has attempted to demonstrate, full
acceptance into the beliefs of the officer corps will take
longer. There remains a curious blend of inevitability,
self-doubt, and caution among the Navy's officer corps that
is at variance with a concept that has been internalized
into the organization's beliefs.275
The Navy is providing a higher quality of officers to
the JS, and these me: and women no longer view joint duty as
a dead end. But, accommodation vice internalization is
evident when considering that the Navy still has trouble
meeting promotional milestones, and is still dependent on
waivers for certain categories of joint officers.
The Navy has placed increased importance on professional
military and joint education. The number of officers
274Secretary of Defense Report, 111-6. As discussed in Chapter VI.
25 See the quotations and discussion in Chapter VI concerning
"Perceptions' and in Chapter II under organizational culture.
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pursuing joint education And the number of billets available
for education in the Navy has expanded. The importance of
education in the promotion of Naval officers has also
increased. But, the Navy's system of education remains
different from the other services in that, the Navy
continues to have essentially a one-step approach. Despite
Congressional prodding, the Navy's system of education
remains a product of its overall culturally bound
operational focus.
Proof that there has been an acceptance of jointness,
but lack of internalization, is illustrated by reviewing the
output products, in chis case, plans and operations.
Planning has improved but remains highly colored by service
advocacy. The national emphasis on jointness has not
translated into joint strategic writings and service
strategies that follow.
Operations in the Gulf War were plagued by underlying
deficiencies in joint interoperability. The Navy suffered
from this most acutely, as its traditional methods of
autonomous operations did not mesh with a system that has
become increasingly more joint. Failure to attack
deficiencies in this area before they became battlefield
challenges are perhaps the most revealing artifact of the
Navy's deficient internalization of jointness.
Interpretation problems arise from a lack of shared
understanding and agreement as to what some of the original
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GNA changes were intended to achieve. As Chapter II
indicates what is "defined as 'change' depends on immediate
effect and what we expect or hope for."276 The hypothesis
that the GNA was fundamentally aimed at creating a more
balanced power distribution between service and joint
institutions is dependent on the effectiveness of the change
mechanisms. As Chapters IV and V emphasize, the key
provisions implementing these mechanisms are contained in
Title IV. These include promotions, assignments, and
education.
Organizational theory holds that these mechanisms can be
used to produce cultural change. The genesis of the Title
IV provisions indicates that it was drafted in the
expectation that these mechanisms would stimulate cultural
change. Subsequent assessments in Congressional reports
also highlight this point. Joint education, in particular,
is viewed as "a major way to change the professional
military culture so that officers accept and support the
strengthened joint elements., 277 Yet, some leaders still
disagree on what type of change was intended, a factor which
contributes to the lack of shared understanding. Rep. Ike
Skelton states:
Did we intend to cause a cultural change? No, we
don't want to change the culture of the services.
276Schein, 298.
27Panel on Military Education Report, 12.
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We might have changed some of it, but that really
wasn't our initial intention.278
VADM M. Boorda felt that calling the intended change, "a
cultural shift was too strong, but that the desired effect
was to create a greater awareness of jointness." 219
This thesis argues that the power distribution between
the services cannot be shifted without altering the
individual service and joint organizational cultures. The
two concepts are mutually reinforcing. Lasting change in
one will affect the other. Previous efforts to reform DOD
have concentrated on shifting statutory power through
structural changes with predictable, shortlived results. The
service institutions are strong and vigorous. They control
the money and programs which reinforce power. By tying both
individual survival and the top leadership positions to
joint duty, Congress has created a cultural change mechanism
that is altering the U.S. military and individual service
cultures. These mechanisms are working to offset the strong
programmatic power of the services. Understanding what was
intended and what is actually occurring is essential to
ensure that the mechanisms are best suited towards the
ultimate goal of enhancing national security. The present
understanding is inconsistent. Perhaps denial of the





culture reflects underlying organizational assumptions
rooted in service pride and beliefs. As stated in Chapter
II, belief in the organization is paramount, fostering
action to ensure survival and health. New situations and
challenges are handled within the bounds of organizational
culture. While the wrappings may change to fit the
situation, the basic tenets which represent the essence of
the organization are consistent.
The Navy cannot continue to have it both ways. Since
1947 the Navy has been on the "losing side" of every
contentious issue involving service unification. While the
Congress and the nation have moved in one direction, the
Navy has lagged behind. Rather than preserve naval autonomy
this divergence has stimulated more conflict. Curiously,
few in the Navy or outside it really wants to change the
Navy's culture. But the GNA, coupled with the environmental
and sociological changes, make Navy cultural change
virtually inevitable. Whether we take aggressive initiative
to shape these changes or continue to tread a more cautious
middle ground of accommodation will determine how the
resulting balance of power is forged.
B. SYSTEMIC DISCONTINUITIES
Connected to the Navy's failure to completely
internalize jointness are significant systemic deficiencies
that prevent full realization of the advantages of
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"jointness." The focus has been too uni-dimensional. As
illustrated, the post-GNA legislative oversight has been
primarily in the fields of educational/officer management.
The Senate attempted strategy hearings in 1987, but there
has been little more than this token effort.280 The
Skelton Panel recognized the importance of the other areas
that it was not able to examine.8 Unfortunately there is
no evidence that anyone else has given serious attention to
these areas either. In the action-reaction world of DOD-
Congressional relations, DOD has concerned itself with
implementing the programs mandated by law, while refraining
from consideration of larger issues. One officer assigned
to the Navy Office of Legislative Affairs stated, "we don't
have time to give Congress the information they want, let
alone look at anything else."282
The system currently in place, aimed at fostering the
joint perspective, is deficient because it encourages this
tunnel vision. By focusing on officer management, Congress
has demonstrated where it believes the change mechanisms
lie. But if a truly outstanding officer is shaped by the
equation: Experience + Education + Training, then each
280Most of the GNA oversight has been on Title IV-related issues including
GAO reports and Congressional Hearings. Based on a content analysis of the
amount of time devoted to Title IV followup versus other GNA investigation,
approximately seventy percent of the Congressional hearings have been devoted
to this area.
28Panel on Military Education Reort, 62
282Interview by author, July 1991.
138
dimension of the equation should receive similar emphasis.
By focusing on some narrow aspects of experience and
education, such as the primacy of the joint side of these
variables, Congress has unwittingly skewed the focus away
from other areas that also are important. Are joint
exercises getting sufficient attention? Has training really
become more joint? What is the evidence that more
professional military and joint education is necessarily
better? It certainly cannot hurt individuals, but it may
impede overall force readiness if the focus on education is
without commensurate emphasis on joint exercises and
training.
The cloudiness and inarticulation of already legislated
provisions, the interpretation problems, the focus on
numerical measures, and the numerous changes to the GNA have
contributed to these problems. Communication, cooperation,
and continuity from both DOD and Congress would go a long
way in accommodating the more difficult aspects of the law.
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS - NAVY
The Navy should step forward with aggressive and
assertive initiatives on jointness. This would facilitate
shaping the issues by ensuring a sufficient naval cultural
perspective is included. Demonstrating initiative and
leadership towards jointness would contribute towards
dispelling lingering perceptions of Naval isolationism.
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This leader 'hip thrust would accelerate the assimilation of
a joint perspective in the Naval officer corps. One OPNAV
Captain stated that "we have no program for improving
jointness... the answer lies within this building in the
hands of its leaders.1 283
Jointness can provide a worthwhile mechanism for
maintaining military service capabilities in a time of
significantly decreasing budgets. For the Navy to maximize
the force-multiplying effects of jointness, there are
several areas which should be addressed. These include:
joint and professional military education, Navy presence on
joint staffs (qualitative and quantitative), and Navy
efforts to develop both joint doctrine and service doctrine
to match.
The Navy's professional military education system should
be aligned to match the true two-tiered process of the other
services. Congress placed significant emphasis on creating
a system of education that depends upon a hierarchy of
learning. The response by the Navy as to the difficulty of
implementing this repeated old arguments about lack of
officer end-strength, low officer-to-enlisted ratios
relative to the other services, and lack of facility space
283Interview with OPNAV 0-6, July 1991, by author.
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for expanding education.284 Another reason offered is that
the technical and operational difficulties involved in the
safe operation of submarines, surface ships, and aircraft
demand more emphasis on operations. The feeling is that
more time ashore, at school, will reduce operational
proficiency. Another argument against more school is that
there is no demonstrated operational benefit gained from
more education. The counter argument to all of those Navy
positions is that no statistical proof exists that taking
another year out of a career for education will result in
less operational proficiency. Both sides of the argument
are circuitous. If the Navy worked to aggressively change
structural inhibitors that preclude increased professional
military education in a career, then the operational
proficiency question would become secondary.
There are possibilities as to how the Navy could remove
these structural blocks. RADM Cossey comments that:
The Navy could obtain more balance between
operations and education by cutting time at sea,
increasing officer end strength, shortening command
tours, and investigating alternative tracks which
recognize options other than command at sea for
advancement.. .but not all these make sense,
therefore, the options must be examined closely.28S
284See analysis in Chapter VI and an explanation of the Navy system with
its accompanying rationale in Secretary of Defense Report to The
Congressional committees on Armed Services, Assessment of Professional
Military Education in The Services, and Discussion of Proposed Legislation,
8 August 1990. Another blocking point is that the Navy would have to expand
its educational facilities and this costs money.
2 5Cossey, interview.
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This study recommends that the Navy pursue several options.
First, it could pursue more relative officer end strength, a
concept to which Congress has been amenable. Justification
should include a study or model that proves numerically what
additional numbers are needed to support a two-tiered
educational pattern in Navy officer careers. This must
include validation of the Navy's claims that anymore time
away from operations in an officer's career is detrimental
to readiness and safety. An historical study of the careers
of a large population of Naval officer should be undertaken
to determine if any correlation exists between years away
from operations and poor readiness or safety. As one Navy
commander said "it takes more skill to drive ships and
planes than it does to run a battalion.n286 This is a
widely held perception, but is it based on fact?
Second, examine Navy career progression and emphasis.
The Navy system is highly wedded to advancement gates. In
fact, the GAO found it necessary to use executive officer
screening in the Navy as an equivalent to selection for
senior professional military education in the other
services. The Navy should inject more flexibility into its
career progression. Solving the end-strength problem is
tied to this recommendation. Navy O-4s and O-5s advance
faster then their Army and Air Force counterparts.
286Interview with Navy 0-5, July 1991, By author.
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Restrictive emphasis on career progression at these ranks
squeezes out time for education.2"7
The traditional Navy disdain for staff work,
particularly joint staff duty, has left a legacy of under-
representation on joint staffs, joint duty assignments, and
critical joint billets.288 In the most ideal situation an
officer with a "healthy" joint perspective will produce
balanced plans and operations - the key outputs. In the
real world, however, one thousand Air Force voices may bury
one hundred Navy voices. While the best idea usually wins,
getting that idea heard without having balanced staffs is
difficult. The balance should include numbers, rank, and
quality. The recent Gulf War indicated the Navy's
deficiencies on the first two points. The Navy should
actively pursue balanced numerical and hierarchial
representation on joint staffs. The pending DOD unified
command reorganization offers an opportunity to correct
historical deficiencies.
The Navy's efforts toward developing joint doctrine over
the past few years have been laudable. There is little
evidence, however, that service doctrine (NWPs etc...) are
287For discussion on alternative career paths see, Clausen, Joint
Specialty Officers: Improving the Military During a Period of Reform, and
Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending America's Security
(Washington, DC: Brassey's INC, 1990), 195-205.
288This "disdain, is largely reflective of the environmental aspect of
Naval culture. Ships at sea do not have the space for large staffs,
therefore the Navy's culture has reinforced the lack of emphasis on staffs.
143
being revised to match.289 Rewriting publications is un-
glamorous and time-consuming, costly work - an effort
unlikely to receive attention in times of budget calamity.
This is unfortunate because without a focused guiding set of
doctrinal principles, coping with change is difficult.
Whether one buys the hypothesis that GNA was intended to
cause a cultural change misses the point that the present
international and domestic environment have forced cultural
change on the services. A guiding set of Navy principles,
rooted in doctrine and strategy that supports the emerging
joint doctrine, would ease the turmoil.
D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS - DOD
This study forwards three recommendations for DOD-wide
policy on jointness. The first recommendation is to be more
proactive on joint issues, particularly Title IV. Dr.
Archie Barrett states:
No one on the joint side is looking out for joint
interests. They are seemingly endorsing what the
services send along in terms of Title IV issues.2 90
DOD should demonstrate to Congress and the services that it
is in front of the issues by taking aggressive and truly
innovative initiatives toward revising Title IV in light of
Congressional intent.
289See Chapter VI under plans. This conclusion was based, in part, by the
author's review of post-Desert Storm fleet CINC lesson learned messages.
290Barrett, interview.
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Secondly, it is necessary to take a more systemic look
at the Title IV interlocking pieces. The present system has
created numerous advancement and career gates, such as time
sequenced education, joint duty, joint specialists, tour
length requirements, promotional equality between joint and
service jobs, and flag officer wickets. Congress has
correctly given DOD some waiver authority so that the system
does not inadvertently block a qualified leader from
advancing. In reality, the ability to exercise this waiver
authority is limited. The current trend is for DOD to shun
waivers and Congress to encourage few exceptions. More
should be done to preclude inadvertently excluding
tomorrow's leaders. For example, the following process
might be considered.
Step one would be to revalidate the existing joint duty
designated assignments. The focus should be on warfighting.
The numbers (8000-9000) for the joint duty assignment list
and 1000 for critical positions should be based an more than
"pie in the sky" guesses. This may mean a smaller joint
duty list. The argument that a smaller list would unduly
restrict certain individuals and create an elitist cadre of
officers misses the point. Creating the joint specialty
concept has already created an additional sub-group in the
military. Its elitism is no more manifest than service
pride or career pride. Worrying about "elitism" is akin to
clinging to myths of creeping Prussianism - it won't happen
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in American culture. By basing the joint duty assignments
on demonstrated need and quality positions, this would
actually enhance the status of joint duty. Many people
interviewed for this study viewed the joint duty assignment
list as the single biggest problem with the joint specialty
programs. By elevating less challenging and less demanding
positions to premier status, the system has created a
"ticket punch" approach, as opposed to one based on job
satisfaction and pride.
Step two would involve creating viable options to
aspiring and aggressive officers for obtaining joint duty
credit and joint specialty officer designation. The
proposal forwarded in the Senate version of the FY 92/93
Defense Authorization Bill is an example in which,
individuals serving in joint positions during the Gulf War
would receive joint duty credit.9 The system should
examine the output, the officer, rather than focus on the
process. Quality is shaped by education, experience, and
training. It is individuals that undergo this shaping
process. For example, officer "A" may have attended
intermediate service school, the Armed Forces Staff College,
and served three years in a joint duty assignment while his
29'Congress, Senate, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993, Report, 102nd. Cong., Ist sess., 266-267. This provision was
dropped from the conference version of the bill pending further study. Rick
Maze, 'Gulf War Vets Won't Get Special Joint-Duty Credit,* Navy Times, 25
November 1991, 9. The author is not advocating this particular proposal,
only making the point that alternative paths to gaining joint duty credit
should be explored.
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colleague officer "B" served five months as a member of a
special joint crises response team. Under the current
system officer "A" would qualify for screening as a JSO
while officer "B" would not. Officer "B" may know more
about joint matters, he may have a better joint perspective,
and he may have experienced more socialization with officers
from the other services. Individuals can learn, socialize,
and internalize in a variety of methods, speeds, and
processes. A rigid system excludes the necessary
flexibility for cultivating the individual. The Skelton
panel identified innate talent as one of the most important
dimensions in the officer quality equation. An innovative
and flexible system is more conducive to developing this
innate talent than a rigid one - the present system needs
alternatives.292
Admiral Bull Halsey attended both the Naval War college
and the Army War college. He rose to heroic heights within
the Navy. Yet, under the current system he may have been
excluded from the joint "wickets" because his commissioning
lineal number would be too low. 293 Do we really want to
exclude the Admiral Halseys of tomorrow?
292Panel on Military Education Report, 29. States that 'innate talent
probably is the most fundamental component for development of a strategist.,
Such officers should be identified *as early as possible during their
careers.'
293Admiral Halsey graduated last in his Naval Academy class. Therefore
he would have had a low lineal number through at least the 0-4 level under
the current promotion system.
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The joint officer management process should focus on
measuring the officer output by a written examination and
oral board system. Admiral Leon Edney, CINCLANT, believes
that some of the personnel provisions could be better
managed if lawmakers would "tell us the principles of joint
knowledge", then "give us an exam on the material."294  A
rigorous screening process would consider officer records
for consideration as JSOs based on a combination of joint
duty, educational background, examination, and board
results. While this is more rigorous, it is less rigid.
Officer "B" might pass with honors, while officer "A" flunk
the board. Making the system competitive would also
alleviate a sense of having closed the door on an
individual's chances for JSO consideration because of missed
"wickets."
Step three in creating flexibility and ensuring proper
focus in the joint personnel management system would involve
examining DOD requirements to ensure they are not overly
restrictive. One JS LCOL said that "a lot of wickets are
self imposed."29 5 For example, DOD has excluded O-3s and
below from joint duty credit,2 96 even though GNA has no
'"Navy Times, 20 May 1991, 15
295Interview by author October, 1991.
296Furthermore, Congress has excluded them from joint education because
of the determination that the intermediate level (0-4) of profession3l
military education is the appropriate level for beginning joint education,
see Panel on Military Education Reoort, 14.
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provision exempting O-3s from joint duty. The thinking is
that an 0-3 has not yet achieved service excellence, so that
an officer would not be ready to take on a joint
perspective. This conclusion counters learning theory which
states that events which occur "early in the person's adult
life have an especially great impact on his perceptual
predispositions.297
Both DOD, from an experience standpoint, and Congress,
from an educational vantage, are overly restrictive.
Extending joint duty and joint education opportunities to
qualified, and exceptionally outstanding, O-3s would be
beneficial.
The third overall DOD policy recommendation is the
establishment of a Joint Oversight Commission. This special
commission would assess the overall readiness of the
military to engage in joint operations. It could include a
review of plans (strategies and warplans), programs,
training, exercises, manning, and education. Such a
holistic approach would require broad guidelines and
objectives. Establishing such a commission would facilitate
a method of measuring jointness as an output, rather than a
process. Defining the boundaries of what constituted
adequate joint readiness would not be easy. Such an
undertaking is not, however, unrealistic, given the
29 Jervis, 249
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important national security implications it portends. The
Commission should consist of officers from all services,
Congressional representatives, and defense experts. It
should meet frequently enough in the field, classrooms, and
training facilities to establish a first-hand view of how
things are being run.
This is a revolutionary recommendation. Commissions
carry a one-time stigma and normally operate outside the
process so as to provide unbiased views. This Commission,
however, is viewed as a permanent component of evaluating
defense readiness. A powerful tool for the CJCS, SECDEF,
President, and Congress to assess the readiness of the
military to defend U.S. national security interests. At a
minimum the present oversight of total military readiness,
particularly with respect to joint warfighting, should be
more output-orientated. Correct, focused, and educated
changes to the present joint system can only be made if the
effect on the output is known - does the present system,
which is aimed at fostering jointness, enhance the
military's ability to fight? Presently, answering this
question, short of war, is based on disjointed and piecemeal
processes. DOD and the nation need a holistic approach.
The growing challenges that the United States faces on
both the international and domestic fronts cannot be
ignored. Shrinking budgets are forcing fundamental
restructuring of the military. Jointness offers perhaps the
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best means to effectively do more with less. The first step
in accomplishing this will be internalization of the
concept.
Jointness isn't a threat to organizational survival.
Nor is it a panacea for defense and service ills. It is a
concept - a mindset that says "let's have the best team,
regardless of the cost to the individual service." As one
Navy commander put it, "your question should be, not is
jointness working but, what have you done for jointness
today?" 298 In concert with this internalization, Congress
and DOD must work together to reexamine what the focus of
jointness should be. Define jointness, discuss it,
disseminate it, and then dissect it through tough, impartial
regular reviews that look at the joint system. Such an
approach reinforces the internalization process as the
players concentrate on what's important, rather than simply
trying to meet the requirements.
298 Interview with Navy 0-5, July 1991, by author.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter highlights some major points of this study.
First, the individual military services have distinct
cultures. This unique service culture shapes the way the
services operate, plan, and manage their people more than we
might think. A sensitivity for this service culture amongst
military and political leaders would enhance interservice
cooperation and hence national security.
Secondly, cultural change is a slow and involved
process. Considerable lag exists between the time change
mechanisms are implemented and when the system reaches
steady-state. The nearly annual revisions to the GNA, some
of which constitute considerable change, not just mid-course
guidance, have compounded the evaluation of the balance
between service and joint institutions. The mechanisms have
barely had time to get initiated, let alone cause the system
to reach steady-state.
Third, more discussion, understanding, and study of
proposed and enacted changes must occur. Both the
initiators of change in Congress and enactors in DOD must
have a shared understanding of the intended and potential
unintended consequences of change. It is not enough to say,
"we didn't intend to change service culture" if that is in
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fact what is happening or if other parties involved in the
drafting of the mechanisms had that in mind.
Fourth, implementing and managing the Title IV
provisions of GNA, have consumed considerable time,
manpower, and funds. Of all the areas covered by the GNA
this single aspect, more than any others, has become the
focus of jointness. This has translated into a process,
vice output focus and has actually hindered fully achieving
the concept of jointness which Title IV was designed to
enhance.
Fifth, despite this paper's contention that there have
been too many changes to the law, some revision is warranted
to correct deficiencies which preclude the system from being
fully credible. The joint duty assignment list (JDAL) has
lost a warfighting focus. The entire method in which the
system cultivates JSOs lacks the necessary flexibility for
managing individuals' careers. There must be alternative
paths to the top which measure the quality - not the number
of checks in the correct block.
Sixth, will the balance of power between service and
joint institutions as it is presently evolving result in the
most efficient, synergistic, and effective fighting force?
Can the present system of oversight, both externally from
Congress and internally via DOD assessments, provide a
satisfactory answer to this question? If not, then perhaps
the recommendation of a Joint Oversight Commission contained
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in Chapter VII should be considered. The evaluation system
must examine the balance between education, exercises, and
training. Without a holistic approach to jointness,
achieving the maximum benefit from the team approach will
never be realized.
Finally, the Navy has made significant strides in
becoming a partner with jointness. However, service-unique
root incompatibilities exist between the Navy's way of doing
business and that of the other services. These are most
evident in the educational, operational, and promotional
areas. The Navy must examine these incompatibilities to
ensure they still make sense. The Goldwater-Nichols Act and
the "new world order" have made cultural change inevitable.
Whether the Navy continues to tow a cautious line of
accommodation or whether it aggressively acts to internalize
"jointness" will determine how the evolving balance of power




YEAR = FY 1990 / (0-6) / (0-5) / (0-4)
SERVICE / CATEGORY / 1 2 3 /1 2 3 /1 2 3
Air Force/ JS / 55 64 60 /86 100 93 /100 - 100
JSO / 64 64 64 /78 78 78 /- - -
SHQS / 60 70 65 /90 100 95 /98 100 99
OJ / 48 40 44 /77 63 70 /92 83 88
BA / 44 44 44 /64 64 64 /84 84 84
ARMY / JS / 41 45 43 /90 100 95/- - -
JSO / 41 41 41 /83 83 83/- - -
SHQS / 51 52 52 /78 82 80 /100 100 100
OJ / 13 9 11 /50 22 36 /73 67 70
BA / 37 37 37 /61 61 61 /65 65 65
NAVY / JS / 88 0 44 /100 67 84 /- - -
JSO / 69 69 69 /72 72 72 I- - -
SHQS / 47 47 47 /78 77 78 /50 - 50
OJ / 21 0 11 /37 20 29 /100 71 86
BA / 47 47 47 /62 62 62 /80 80 80
YEAR = FY 1989 / (0-6) / (0-5) / (0-4)
SERVICE / CATEGORY. / 1 2 3 /1 2 3 /1 2 3
Air Force/ JS / 58 67 63 /91 100 96 /- - -
JSO / 68 68 68 /93 93 93 /- - -
SHQS / 59 58 59 /92 100 96 /- - -
OJ / 42 27 35 /70 69 70 /- - -
BA / 44 44 44 /64 64 64/- - -
ARMY / JS / 53 17 35 /100 100 100/100 100 100
JSO / 47 47 47 /79 79 79 /- - -
SHQS / 40 35 38 /80 75 78 /86 88 87
OJ / 28 12 20 /68 49 59 /86 86 86
BA / 41 41 41 /61 61 61 /69 69 69
NAVY / JS / 67 - 67 /- - - /67 - 67
JSO / 70 - 70 /64 100 82 /- - -
SHQS / 38 100 69 /93 50 72 /75 100 88
OJ / 28 0 14 /45 - 45 /55 50 53
BA / 49 49 49 /61 61 61 /73 73 73
NOTES:
1. All numbers are percentages based on in-zone promotion only.
2. Categories are: JS=Joint Staff, JSO=Joint Specialty Officer,
SHQS=Sezvice Headquarters Staff, OJ=Other Joint, and BA=Board Average
3. Column (1) represents the *are serving in* that position category;
column (2) is the 'have served in" category; column (3) is the average of
columns (1) and (2).
4. ( - ) represents missing data
5. Na,.y numbers represent uniestricted line only. The Navy totals do not
reflect the Marine Corps.
6. Source of Data is the Secretary of Defense Report to Congress for FY91
and FY92 (reports FY90 and 89 promotional data).
155
7. Comparisons, bold numbers, are based on the lowest in that category.
Comparison excludes 1989, 0-5, JS since the Navy reported no data, and only
compares certain 0-4 categories where enough data existed. 1990 Navy lowest
in 12/21 areas (57%); Army 8/21 (38%); Air Force 1/21 (5%)
1989 Navy lowest in 11/19 areas (58%); Army 9/19 (47%); Air Force 0/19.
Navy is also missing 6 data points from the 1989 0-5 and 0-6 data.
8. The key "-terservice comparisons based on the GNA are derived from
considering three points of the law: 1. Promotions of officers who have
served or are serving on the Joint Staff (JS) are expected to be promoted
at a rate not less than comparable contemporaries on service headquarters
staffs. 2. Promotions of officers with the joint specialty (JSOs) must be
at a rate not less than comparable contemporaries on service headquarters
staffs. 3. Other joint duty assignments for officers other than the above





Time precluded a deeper examination of a number of
issues examined in this thesis. First, the major policy
recommendations forwarded need expansion and analysis.
Second, the recommendation that the Navy's claim for
operational emphasis be objectively proved or disproved
needs further examination. This would lend credence to
traditional Navy arguments concerning the inherent
difficulty and necessity for operations at sea. It also
might prove that another year out of operations for
education over a twenty year career has insignificant
adverse operational impact on the Navy. Third, ongoing
initiatives, such as the Joint Warfare Doctrine and OSD
Title IV JDAL review, hold promise for correcting systemic
deficiencies. These efforts should be supported, continued,
and studied. Fourth, examination of the finding that the
Navy still experiences shortfalls in numerous promotional
categories relative to the other services should be extended
to include the 1991 data which was not yet available. The
data should also be analyzed according to trend analysis
since 1988. A comprehensive review of promotional data,
Navy shorttalls, and the Navy detailing system might provide
a baseline for injecting the additional career path and
promotional flexibility that this study recommended. Fifth,
a model that validates the existing JDAL, based on the
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number of O-6s that must have joint duty assignments to
ensure an adequate talent pool for flag selectivity, must be
developed. The current JDAL seems too large and its
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